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THE TAIL STILL WAGS THE DOG: 
THE PERVASIVE AND INAPPROPRIATE INFLUENCE 
BY THE PSYCHIATRIC PROFESSION ON 
THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS 
WILLIAM M. BROOKS* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The imposition of substantive and procedural protections in the civil 
commitment process thirty years ago created the expectation that courts 
would scrutinize commitment decisions by psychiatrists more closely and 
serve as a check on psychiatric decision-making.  This has not happened. 
Today, psychiatrists continue to play an overly influential role in the 
civil commitment process.  Psychiatrists make initial commitment decisions 
that often lack accuracy because they rely on clinical judgment only.  
Furthermore, many psychiatrists do not want legal standards interfering 
with treatment decisions, and the nebulous nature of the concept of danger-
ousness enables doctors to make pretextual assessments of danger.  At civil 
commitment hearings, lawyers for patients often fail to vigorously represent 
their clients.  Judges continue to defer, almost blindly, to expert testimony.  
The result, no doubt, has been the confinement of nondangerous mentally ill 
individuals. 
Numerous steps can be taken to help lessen the inappropriate influence 
of psychiatrists.  First, psychiatrists can engage in structured risk assess-
ment evaluations.  Next, courts can, as a matter of right, provide expert 
assistance to patients in a way that will not significantly delay civil commit-
ment proceedings.  Furthermore, courts should prohibit expert opinion 
testimony on dangerousness based on clinical judgment alone.  Finally, 
patients’ lawyers can systematically appeal civil commitment decisions to 
facilitate the development of a body of law that can serve to clarify what 
mental states and conduct constitute a sufficient level of dangerousness as 
to warrant involuntary hospitalization. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, psychiatric hospitals involuntarily confine more 
than one million individuals per year,1 a process the Supreme Court has 
characterized as “a massive curtailment of liberty[.]”2  Until the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, hospitals committed individuals on the basis that such 
people required care and treatment.3  Indeed, prior to 1972, courts paid little 
attention to the standards and procedures governing civil commitment.4  
The civil commitment process was characterized by cursory psychiatric 
evaluations that resulted in commitment of most individuals against whom 
proceedings were commenced; individuals were powerless and the commit-
ment process forced them into psychiatric hospitals, often for indeterminate 
periods.5 
However, in 1972, a three-judge court, in Lessard v. Schmidt,6 invalid-
dated Wisconsin’s civil commitment laws on both substantive and proce-
dural grounds.7  The court found the state’s commitment standards violated 
substantive due process because the standards authorized the confinement 
of nondangerous individuals.8  Because civil commitment deprived an 
individual of liberty, the state could justify its means only by invoking a 
compelling government interest.9  Only the interest in protecting against 
harm to oneself or others justified depriving someone of liberty through the 
 
*Professor of Law and Director of the Civil Rights Litigation Law Clinic, Touro College, 
Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Central Islip, New York.  The author would like to thank Rodger 
Citron for his helpful comments on the article.  The author would also like to thank Laurel Spahn, 
Tony Rothert, and Susan Stefan for gathering or facilitating the gathering of data about the civil 
commitment process in areas outside of New York. 
1. John K. Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and Parens Patriae Powers in 
Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 377, 
378 n.6 (1998). 
2. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 
(1972)). 
3. Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 39 (1999). 
4. In 1972, the Supreme Court noted the absence of litigation challenging the states’ author-
ity to confine mentally ill individuals.  See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 n.22 (1972). 
5. Virginia A. Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures:  An Empirical Study in the 
Courtroom, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 651 (1977). 
6. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Schmidt v. 
Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated and enforced sub nom. Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 
1376 (D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Schmidt v. Lessard, 421 U.S. 957 
(1975), reinstated sub nom. Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
 7.  Id. at 1090-1103. 
8. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093. 
 9.  Id. at 1084. 
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state’s civil commitment process.10  Three years later, the Supreme Court 
reached a similar conclusion in the context of a damages action filed by an 
individual confined many years at a state psychiatric hospital in Florida.  
The court held, in O’Connor v. Donaldson,11 the state could not confine a 
nondangerous individual who was capable of living safely outside an insti-
tutional setting with the help of family or friends.12 
Following the decisions in Lessard and O’Connor, numerous lower 
courts examined the constitutionality of civil commitment laws that 
authorized the confinement of nondangerous individuals.  These statutes 
authorized confinement of individuals deemed to be in need of care and 
treatment regardless of whether the patient was dangerous.13  This type of 
commitment standard places great discretion in the hands of physicians:  
whether a person requires care and treatment for mental illness requires a 
clinician to simply exercise clinical judgment as a way to determine 
whether a patient satisfies the legal criteria for civil commitment. 
The courts that examined the constitutionality of the states’ commit-
ment standards unanimously held states could not confine involuntarily 
nondangerous mentally ill individuals.14  A state’s interest in providing the 
care and treatment deemed necessary simply could not justify the signifi-
cant deprivation of liberty that civil commitment entailed.15  As a result, 
physicians could not confine mentally ill individuals unless the patients 
posed a danger to themselves or others.16  In theory, the imposition of a 
dangerousness requirement in lieu of a care and treatment standard limited 
the amount of clinical discretion psychiatrists exercised because it provided 
more objective criteria to govern civil commitment.17  Moreover, the 
imposition of procedural protections—designed to provide a meaningful 
 
10. Id. at 1084-86. 
11. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
12. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575. 
13. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 965-66 (2d Cir. 1983); Lessard, 349 
F. Supp. at 1093. 
14. See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 973; Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court for Salt Lake Cnty., 469 F. Supp. 424, 432 (D. Utah 1979); 
Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 449-51 (D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 
509, 514-15 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389-92 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v. 
Wayne Cnty. Gen. Hosp. at Eloise, 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1095-98 (E.D. Mich. 1974); State ex rel. 
Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123 (W. Va. 1974). 
15. See, e.g., Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093; State ex rel. Hawks, 202 S.E.2d at 123; In re 
Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983). 
16. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
17. See R. Michael Bagby, The Effects of Legislative Reform on Admission Rates to 
Psychiatric Units of General Hospitals, 10 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 383, 384 (1987) (discussing 
how dangerousness criterion is allegedly more objective and capable of being addressed in a 
sounder evidentiary manner than care and treatment statutes that were couched in medical 
language). 
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opportunity to challenge one’s hospitalization—further theoretically 
curtailed the ability of psychiatrists to effectuate involuntary hospitalization 
of those individuals deemed to be in need of inpatient care because courts 
become the decision-makers as to whether patients have satisfied the civil 
commitment criteria.18 
The imposition of substantive and procedural protections on the civil 
commitment process theoretically made the civil commitment process more 
legalistic than medical in nature.  However, approximately thirty years after 
the imposition of legal protections designed to provide objective legal 
criteria to govern the deprivation of liberty resulting from involuntary 
hospitalization, psychiatrists still exercise not only an inordinate amount of 
influence on the civil commitment process, but an inappropriately inordi-
nate amount of influence on the process.  Indeed, the narrowing of commit-
ment statutes failed to result in a decrease in the instances of commitment, 
which suggests tighter standards and procedures have not been applied in 
practice.19 
The pervasive influence of psychiatrists first begins at the initial 
admission stage.  Most states authorize involuntary confinement of alleg-
edly mentally ill individuals upon the certification of physicians that a civil 
committee poses a danger to the committee’s self or others.20  Once hos-
pitalized, when civil committees challenge their confinement in court, 
psychiatrists testifying on behalf of the confining hospitals render opinions 
about an individual’s mental illness and dangerousness.  However, civil 
committees often do not have the opportunity to offer their own expert.21  
As a result, patients are significantly disadvantaged because judges will 
invariably defer to expert testimony when deciding whether to authorize the 
confinement of the civil committee.22  The upshot is psychiatric hospitals 
 
18. The Supreme Court has held due process required the use of a clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard at commitment hearings.  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979).  
Lower courts have held that due process requires the provision of such procedural protections as 
the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and notice of 
rights.  See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) (right to counsel); 
Stamus, 414 F. Supp. at 447-48 (right to counsel); Doremus, 407 F. Supp. at 515-16 (right to 
counsel, to notice of hearing, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses); Lynch, 386 F. Supp. 
at 388-89 (right to counsel, to notice of hearing, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses); 
Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1092, 1097 (right to counsel and notice of hearing). 
19. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS § 10.05, at 
348 (3d ed. 2007). 
20. Bagby, supra note 17, at 383 (noting forty-eight states had adopted dangerousness 
criterion by 1980); SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 101-
05 (3d ed. 1985) (detailing the authorization of involuntary hospitalization by medical certify-
cations in the majority of states). 
21. See infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text. 
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retain control over the confinement of those individuals deemed to require 
inpatient confinement.23 
Many reasons exist to question the influence psychiatrists exercise over 
the commitment process.  First, psychiatrists possess a well-recognized bias 
toward treatment.24  Second, evidence indicates that while psychiatrists are 
not as inept at evaluating an individual’s dangerousness as originally 
thought, psychiatrists are not particularly good at assessing risk either.25  As 
a result of these considerations, it may well be that only the threat of civil 
liability serves as a check upon psychiatrists’ desire to provide treatment 
that is deemed clinically appropriate by certifying a patient as dangerous.26  
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, few legal concepts are more ambig-
uous than the concept of danger.  The concept of dangerousness has engen-
dered its share of confusion among courts, legislatures, and scholars.  This 
confusion has no doubt resulted in part from the failure of the courts that 
originally required a finding of dangerousness to define what they meant by 
“dangerousness.”27 
Moreover, it remains unclear whether dangerousness is a concept that 
focuses only on the likelihood of causing physical harm to oneself and 
others, or also includes harm to property.  Does it include the likelihood of 
committing emotional harm to others or financial ruin to oneself that results 
from a spending spree in a manic state?  While the commission of harm 
need not be a certainty, must the likelihood of potential harm reach a certain 
probability level before commitment can be authorized?  Must a court or 
psychiatrist take into account the imminence of potential harm?  What 
about the magnitude of potential harm?  The longer these questions remain 
 
23. See, e.g., infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 58-65, 310-11 and accompanying text. 
26. However, because of the difficulty in prevailing in a damages action against a physician, 
even the threat of a damages action may very well prove more illusory than real.  A civil rights 
plaintiff faces a number of hurdles to overcome in order to prevail in an action pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  If the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought release in state court, collateral estoppel will 
bar an attempt to litigate the legality of the confinement.  See, e.g., Kulak v. City of New York, 88 
F.3d 63, 71-73 (2d Cir. 1996).  Furthermore, immunity attaches to physicians’ actions if any 
objectively reasonable basis existed for physicians to conclude patients posed a danger to them-
selves or others.  See, e.g., Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1993).  Courts have shown a 
willingness to equate the symptoms of mental illness with evidence of dangerousness without any 
direct evidence tying the symptomatology with an increased risk of harm.  See, e.g., Mawhirt v. 
Ahmed, 86 F. Supp. 2d 81, 89-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (equating dangerousness with paranoid and 
delusional behavior without any testimony connecting the symptoms with an enhanced risk of 
harm); Katzman v. Khan, 67 F. Supp. 2d 103, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (determining it was 
objectively reasonable to find a plaintiff dangerous as he was delusional and behaving bizarrely). 
27. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983); Stamus v. 
Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 450-51 (D. Iowa 1976); Bell v. Wayne Cnty. Gen. Hosp. at Eloise, 
384 F. Supp. 1085, 1095-98 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1087, 1093 
(E.D. Wis. 1972). 
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unanswered, the greater the power for psychiatrists to confine individuals 
and to seek influence over judicial assessments of danger.28 
A significant difference exists between understanding what a danger-
ousness evaluation actually entails and properly applying the legal and 
clinical criteria an assessment of danger encompasses.  Most state statutes 
and court decisions simply have not incorporated all of the components of a 
dangerousness determination:  probability, imminence, and magnitude of 
harm to person.29  The absence of these clarifying concepts, which would 
limit the discretion of the civil commitment evaluators, provides an oppor-
tunity for psychiatrists to label individuals as dangerous when the doctors 
wish to confine people deemed to be in need of treatment.  Significantly, 
when psychiatrists learn the legal system imposes few constraints on their 
clinical decision-making, they tend to disregard the law and permit their 
clinical judgment to dictate how they will act.30 
This article will first explain what it means to be dangerous:  posing a 
sufficiently high probability of causing harm as to warrant clinical inter-
vention in the form of involuntary hospitalization.  It will then detail that, to 
the extent the ability of psychiatrists to make assessments in the civil 
commitment context is known, the ability is not very good.  Numerous 
reasons exist to explain why psychiatrists lack the ability to accurately 
assess risk.  First, they generally rely excessively on clinical judgment 
alone, which results in a failure to apply criteria that have been empirically 
linked to an increased risk of harm-causing behavior.  Non-clinical factors 
also adversely impact the clinical assessment process.  These factors 
include a bias toward treatment and a fear of liability or other adverse 
consequences if a doctor wrongfully assesses a person as nondangerous. 
Next, this article will describe not only do psychiatrists lack an ability 
to accurately assess danger, but many assessments of risk are pretextual in 
nature.  Doctors want to treat people deemed to require care and treatment, 
and if they must certify a patient as dangerous in order to facilitate 
treatment, doctors will do so.  The article will then focus on the ability of 
civil commitment hearings to remedy errors at the certification stage of the 
commitment process.  Judges routinely defer to psychiatric assessments of 
danger, and lawyers that represent patients all too often fail to engage in the 
 
28. See infra notes 183-214 and accompanying text. 
29. See People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 772-73 nn.4-7 (Colo. 1988) (surveying commitment 
standards throughout the country). 
30. Cf. Paul Appelbaum & Robert Hamm, Decision to Seek Commitment:  Psychiatric 
Decision Making in a Legal Context, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 447, 447 (1982) 
(presenting an empirical study that found a substantial percentage of patients for whom 
psychiatrists applied for commitment did not meet the criteria for commitment); see also infra 
notes 104-30 and accompanying text. 
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kind of vigorous advocacy needed to serve as a check on unfettered clinical 
discretion.  Also, this article will explain why the inherently vague meaning 
of danger further serves to permit clinicians to exercise unfettered 
discretion in the commitment process.  Indeed, without narrowing concepts, 
the meaning of “dangerous” is sufficiently ambiguous as to contravene 
notions of due process. 
This article then offers a number of suggestions to lessen the influence 
of unchecked psychiatric assessments of danger.  First, doctors should 
engage in more structured risk evaluations by necessarily focusing on 
empirically based criteria when conducting assessments of danger.  Next, 
when a patient challenges his or her hospitalization, due process requires 
courts to promptly appoint expert assistance at the commitment hearing.  In 
addition, psychiatrists’ lack of ability to assess risk means courts should not 
permit psychiatrists to render opinions about an individual’s dangerousness, 
at least when these experts base their opinions on clinical judgment alone.  
Furthermore, lawyers for patients in the commitment process should 
systematically appeal adverse decisions for the simple reason that only 
appellate case law can narrow and clarify the ambiguous concept of danger. 
Finally, a word of candor.  The views expressed in this article have 
been shaped by my work experience:  first as an attorney for the New York 
Mental Hygiene Legal Service, representing patients in the civil commit-
ment process; and then as the supervising attorney of a law school clinical 
program that is funded pursuant to the Protection and Advocacy for 
Individuals with Mental Illness Act.31  In the latter role, I am the attorney 
for the plaintiff class in Monaco v. Hogan32  and was the attorney for the 
plaintiff class in Goetz v. Crosson,33 two cases discussed in this article.  
However, I have tried to insure that any position I have taken is supported 
by both the law and professional literature and is not simply a reflection of 
observations.  If anyone disagrees, by all means, respond. 
In addition, I attempted to gather empirical data on the civil commit-
ment process.  Over a ten-year period, information was gathered from 
Suffolk, Queens, and Kings Counties in New York; Dade County in 
Florida; and Cook, Kane, Madison, and Union Counties in Illinois.  These 
counties were chosen simply as a function of finding an individual who was 
 
31. See generally Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42 
U.S.C. ch. 114 (1986).  The PAIMI Act authorizes the provision of legal actions on behalf of 
individuals suffering, or having been diagnosed as suffering, from mental illness.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 10805(a)(1).  The clinic has provided representation to individuals seeking damages who believe 
that they have been wrongly involuntarily hospitalized, and the clinic has served as counsel in a 
number of class actions challenging the civil commitment process. 
32. 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
33. 967 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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in a position to observe the commitment process and willing to tabulate 
what he or she observed.  When pertinent, this article will detail the extent 
to which the empirical findings support or refute contentions set forth in the 
literature. 
II. UNDERSTANDING WHAT A DETERMINATION OF 
DANGEROUSNESS ENTAILS 
More than a little confusion exists over what it means to be danger-
ous.34  The dictionary defines dangerous as able or likely to inflict injury 
and involving the chance of loss or injury.35  Accordingly, a determination 
of dangerousness is a statement of probability.36  Hence, it makes little 
sense to speak of a “prediction of dangerousness.”  When one predicts, one 
states whether an event will occur.37  A bookmaker assesses the odds of an 
underdog beating the favorite; a gambler predicts who will win when 
placing a bet. 
The confusion about the meaning of dangerous has arisen from many 
sources.  The Supreme Court contributed to this confusion when it noted the 
impracticality of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the civil com-
mitment context because of the difficulty in proving “that an individual is 
both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.”38  This text certainly suggests 
the Court equated the concept of danger as the causing of harm.  This is so 
because it should not be particularly difficult for a committing hospital to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt a person is likely to cause harm.  Other 
courts also have contributed to this confusion, concluding the Fourth 
Amendment requires a probability or substantial chance of dangerousness, 
 
34. See, e.g., Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to “Predict 
Dangerousness”:  A Commentary on Interpretations of the “Dangerousness” Literature, 18 LAW 
& PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 43 n.1 (1994). 
35. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 573 (1993). 
36. See, e.g., John Monahan & David Wexler, A Definite Maybe:  Proof and Probability in 
Civil Commitment 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38 (1978); see also Gary Gleb, Comment, 
Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law:  The Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predic-
tions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 226 (1991) 
(distinguishing between assessment of probability and prediction of harm). 
37. See Henry J. Steadman, From Dangerousness to Risk Assessment of Community 
Violence:  Taking Stock at the Turn of the Century, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 265, 266-67 
(2000) (recognizing that assessment of danger has moved from a prediction of a future event to a 
probability assessment). 
38. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S 418, 429 (1979) (emphasis added).  If one recognizes the 
concept of danger is an assessment of risk, then the Supreme Court clearly erred.  It is certainly 
possible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual poses a significant risk of causing 
harm.  See In re Commitment of Kientz, 597 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Wis. 1999) (holding the state 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt it was much more likely than not the committee would engage 
in future acts of violence). 
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as opposed to harm-causing, behavior.39  Courts that have questioned the 
ability of psychiatrists to “predict danger” have also contributed to the 
confusion.40 
Empirical scholarship that has attempted to assess the ability of 
psychiatrists to accurately assess dangerousness has also contributed to the 
confusion.  Empirical studies have attempted to assess the ability of mental 
health professionals to accurately assess danger by tracking mentally ill 
individuals previously assessed as dangerous to determine whether these 
people have caused harm.41  The studies have simply applied elementary 
statistical principles.  When one has determined a high probability of an 
event occurring exists, the failure of the event to take place does not mean 
the prognosticator made an incorrect assessment of risk.  On the other hand, 
an examination of a statistically significant number of events—specifically, 
determinations that a person is at a significant risk of causing harm—will 
provide information about the ability of mental health professionals to 
accurately assess the likelihood of harm-causing behavior.42  Because these 
studies have focused on a statistically significant number of individuals, it 
is not particularly inappropriate for the authors of these studies to ask 
whether mental health professionals possess the ability to “predict behave-
ior” of a statistically significant number of individuals.  However, these 
studies and the use of the word “prediction” may well have created the 
impression an individualized assessment of danger requires a determination 
of whether someone will cause harm; it does not. 
 
39. See Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997); Waananen v. Barry, 343 F. 
Supp. 2d 161, 171 (D. Conn. 2004); Hoffman v. Cnty. of Del., 41 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209 (N.D.N.Y. 
1999).  A few legislatures and courts have authorized civil commitment when an individual is 
likely to be dangerous.  These holdings amount to a directive to determine whether the civil 
commitment subject is likely to likely cause harm. 
40. See, e.g., In re Cochran, 487 N.E.2d 389, 390-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (commenting on the 
inexact nature of “predicting future dangerousness”); Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 7 
(Cal. 1979). 
41. See, e.g., Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 
JAMA 1007, 1008 (1993); Dale McNeil & Renee Binder, Clinical Assessment of the Risk of 
Violence Among Psychiatric Inpatients, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1317, 1318 (1991). 
42. See Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger:  The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil 
Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23 (2003). 
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III. THE ABILITY OF PSYCHIATRISTS TO ASSESS RISK:  WHAT 
WE DO AND DO NOT KNOW 
A. THE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN ASSESSING RISK OF HARM 
Two generations of researchers have examined dangerousness assess-
ments conducted by mental health professionals.43  Authorities in legal and 
medical journals have detailed, with much empirical support, that 
psychiatrists lack the ability to assess danger proficiently.44  This lack of 
skill has resulted in mental health professionals overpredicting instances of 
harmful behavior.45  Accordingly, while the leading scholar on risk assess-
ment, John Monahan, has concluded analysis of current risk assessment 
literature “suggests that clinicians are able to distinguish violent from 
nonviolent patients with a modest, better-than-chance level of accuracy,”46 
he has also concluded little has transpired to inspire confidence in mental 
 
43. See Daniel A. Krauss et al., Beyond Prediction to Explanation in Risk Assessment 
Research, 23 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 91, 110 (2000). 
44. See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil Commitment and Illness Politics:  
Assessing the Current Debate and Outlining a Future Direction, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 131, 144 
(1992-93) (discussing how studies demonstrate a “low rate of accurate predictions of danger-
ousness” and “harmless persons are routinely diagnosed as dangerous”); Herbert A. Eastman, 
Metaphor and Madness, Law and Liberty, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 281, 341 (1991) (stating “journals 
are replete with studies confirming the unreliability of psychiatrists’ predictions as to danger-
ousness”); Lidz et al., supra note 41, at 1009-10 (noting that while an empirical study indicated 
clinicians can predict dangerousness at better-than-chance level, the relatively low numbers of 
accurate assessments of harm demonstrate clinicians are relatively inaccurate predictors of 
violence); Judith S. Thompson & Joel W. Ager, An Experimental Analysis of the Civil 
Commitment Recommendations of Psychologists and Psychiatrists, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 119, 120 
(1988) (“Although some experts disagree . . ., the common interpretation of this literature is that 
mental health professionals are no better able to predict dangerousness than laymen.”). 
45. See David B. Wexler, The Structure of Civil Commitment:  Patterns, Pressures, and 
Interactions in Mental Health Legislation, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3 (1983); see also Deidre 
Klassen & William A. O’Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of Violence in Adult Male 
Mental Health Admissions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 144 (1988) (discussing a number of 
studies on clinical assessments of danger found false positive rates ranging from sixty-five to 
eighty-six percent).  When mental health professionals err, the most common error consists of a 
false positive, a conclusion that a person is dangerous when he or she is not.  See Randy K. Otto, 
Prediction of Dangerous Behavior:  A Review and Analysis of “Second-Generation” Research, 5 
FORENSIC REP. 103, 128 (1992). 
46. John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment:  Scientific Validity and Evidentiary 
Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 915 (2000); see also Randy Borum, Improving the 
Clinical Practice of Violence Risk Assessment:  Technology, Guidelines, and Training, 51 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 945, 946 (1996) (stating a number of authorities believe mental health 
professionals have at least a modest ability to predict violence; predictions of violence are signifi-
cantly more accurate than chance); Michael A. Norko, Commentary:  Dangerousness—A Failed 
Paradigm for Clinical Practice and Service Delivery, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 282, 
286 (2000) (providing the accuracy of assessments of danger by psychiatrists is only modestly 
better-than-chance). 
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health professionals using “unstructured clinical judgment to accurately 
assess violence risk.”47 
One must further recognize that studies that have helped establish 
empirical data relating to harm causing behavior, which help to improve the 
accuracy of assessments of danger made by those professionals who 
carefully apply the data, have often focused on groups of individuals who 
previously engaged in criminal conduct.48  The risk factors inherent in this 
population do not necessarily exist in the class of civil committees deemed 
to pose a danger to others as a result of mental illness.49  Hence, clinicians 
who wish to rely on empirical data when assessing civil committees for the 
risk of violence may have less to guide the assessment process than do 
clinicians who assess insanity acquittees or other population of individuals 
who have committed criminal acts. 
Similarly, research indicates psychiatrists lack the ability to accurately 
assess the risk posed by possible suicidal behavior,50 primarily because 
clinicians fail to take into account the low base rate of suicide.51  As one 
authority has noted, mental health professionals “do not possess any item of 
information or any combination of items that permit us to identify to a 
useful degree the particular persons who will commit suicide, in spite of the 
fact that we do have scores of items available, each of which is significantly 
related to suicide.”52   Furthermore, a substantial percentage, if not a major-
ity, of cases in which psychiatrists label a patient as dangerous in the civil 
commitment context involve instances in which a psychiatrist opines a 
patient is dangerous because of an inability to meet his or her basic needs.53  
 
47. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment:  Forecasting Harm Among Pris-
oners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 406-07 (2006).  One can argue that while 
most studies involving the ability of mental health professionals to assess violence risk involve 
long-term risk of harm, while a decision to civilly commit a mentally ill individual amounts to a 
qualitatively different decision because it involves an assessment of short-term risk.  See John 
Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill 
Persons:  A Reconsideration, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 198, 200 (1978).  While some research 
indicates mental health professionals can assess violence on a short-term basis better than 
originally thought, see Otto, supra note 45, at 129, a review of the studies details only one-in-two 
predictions of short-term behavior are correct. See id. at 130. 
48. See R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 50, 50 (1998). 
49. Id. (citing factors including history or criminal behavior and antisocial personality). 
50. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 326. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. (quoting Alex D. Pokorny, Prediction of Suicide in Psychiatric Patients:  Report of a 
Prospective Study, 40 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249, 257 (1983)). 
53. See Eric Turkheimer & Charles D.H. Parry, Why the Gap?  Practice and Policy in Civil 
Commitment Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 646, 648 (1992) (stating in an empirical study, 
seventy-eight percent of initial commitments and ninety-four percent of recommitments are based 
on a grave disability standard, the equivalent of an inability to meet needs standard); Virginia 
Aldigé Hiday & Lynn Newhart Smith, Effects of the Dangerousness Standard in Civil Commit-
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A survey of literature relating to risk assessment details a complete absence 
of empirical literature validating psychiatrists’ ability to accurately assess 
harm based on an inability to meet basic needs.54 
As a result, no one knows whether psychiatrists possess any profi-
ciency in determining whether patients pose a risk to themselves because of 
an inability to meet their basic needs.  The absence of literature relating to 
an inability to meet basic needs will no doubt result in far less discussion 
about this type of risk assessment.  It will also result in the continuation of 
psychiatric evaluations in an unchecked manner because, in the absence of 
any literature on this topic, an unstated assumption exists that psychiatrists 
can accurately assess whether a person lacks the ability to meet his or her 
needs.  However, the well-documented problems with the exercise of clini-
cal judgment and the other non-clinical factors that adversely impact clini-
cal judgment55 indicate any such assumption more than likely will prove 
false.56 
B. WHY PSYCHIATRISTS ERR WHEN ASSESSING RISK 
1. The Indiscriminate Use of Clinical Judgment 
While psychiatrists routinely rely on their clinical judgments to reach 
conclusions about dangerousness,57 statistical studies have demonstrated 
that assessments of risk based on empirical data are more accurate than the 
clinical method.58  In other words, in all cases of comparison, statistical 
 
ment, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 441-42 (1988) (noting when civil committees failed to engage 
in harm-causing behavior, psychiatrists opined the committees lacked the ability to meet their 
basic needs). 
54. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:  CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 104-21 
(2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2008); see also Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 53, at 648, 651 (discussing 
danger based on an inability to meet needs “has attracted little theoretical or scientific attention;” 
studies of assessments of inability to meet needs have not been undertaken). 
55. See infra notes 57-90 and accompanying text. 
56. This is particularly true because, while ample literature exists informing clinicians of 
what factors empirically related to harm-causing behavior a clinician should evaluate, this author 
is not aware of any literature providing clinicians with empirically-based information relating to 
individuals placing themselves at significant risk because of thinking so disorganized they cannot 
meet their basic needs.  If, even with the existence of professional literature, medical schools and 
hospitals have lacked the ability to train psychiatrists to adequately assess individuals’ risk of 
violence, what basis exists to believe psychiatrists have been adequately trained to assess an 
inability to meet basic needs? 
57. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment With 
Sex Offenders:  Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1444, 
1454, 1497 (2003). 
58. See William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, 
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures:  The Clinical-
Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 293, 298 (1996); Monahan, supra note 
47, at 407-08; see Janus & Prentky, supra note 57, at 1444, 1454 (noting in only eight cases of 
128 did the clinical method out-perform the actuarial assessments).  The clinical method involves 
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predictions were superior to clinical predictions, and statistical predictions 
yielded relatively lower false positive rates.59 
When assessing risk based on clinical judgment alone, psychiatrists 
often fail to act in a properly systematic manner when gathering informa-
tion necessary to accurately assess risk.60  Instead, the exercise of clinical 
judgment related to an assessment of risk may well depend on murky and 
ambiguous clinical hunches.61  Accordingly, one must recognize the exer-
cise of clinical judgment alone produces uneducated and uninformed 
decisions.62  Notwithstanding the failures and antiquated nature of the 
unstructured clinical judgment process, only a minority, and maybe a small 
minority, of mental health professionals employ structured risk assessment 
techniques.63 
Perhaps the use of clinical judgment alone produces the errors it does 
because, despite advances in knowledge about the risk of violence by 
people with mental illness, there have been virtually no systematic efforts to 
incorporate the information into a useful, empirically-based framework for 
clinical assessment.  Legal constraints may require clinicians to use empiri-
cal data to guide the evaluation process because due process requires clini-
cians to conduct civil commitment evaluations pursuant to standards that 
promote some degree of accuracy.64  Accordingly, mental health profess-
sionals must integrate the almost separate worlds of research on the 
assessment of violence risk with clinical practices on a day-to-day basis to 
 
an evaluator utilizing his or her own intuitive judgment after considering any information deemed 
appropriate.  See Grove & Meehl, supra, at 293. 
59. Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 45, at 144; see also Hanson, supra note 48, at 54, 61-63 
(describing the accuracy of clinical assessments of danger as “unimpressive,” while approaches 
that direct clinicians to consider empirically-based factors provide greater accuracy); Grant T. 
Harris & Marnie E. Rice, Risk Appraisal and Management of Violent Behavior, 48 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 1168, 1169 (1997) (stating actuarial methods constantly outperform professional judg-
ment in assessment of danger); Thomas Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of 
Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409, 409 (2001) (noting numerous authorities 
recognize actuarial assessments of risk have been proven superior to unstructured clinical 
assessments). 
Admittedly, much of the literature challenging the efficacy of clinical judgment addressed the 
ability of clinicians to “predict” harm as opposed to assessing risk.  See, e.g., Grove & Meehl, 
supra note 58, at 299.  However, any prediction of harm-causing behavior is based on an 
assessment of risk.  Hence, if actuarial methodology produces greater accuracy in the predictive 
process than clinical judgment, then actuarial methods provide a more accurate picture of the level 
of risk posed in comparison to clinical judgment. 
60. See In re R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 80-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
61. See Douglas Mossman, Commentary:  Assessing the Risk of Violence—Are “Accurate” 
Predictions Useful?, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 272, 277 (2000). 
62. Litwack, supra note 59, at 413. 
63. John Monahan, Tarasoff at Thirty:  How Developments in Science and Policy Shape the 
Common Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 497, 513-14 (2006). 
64. See Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1062 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding due 
process requires clinicians to make commitment decisions that promise some degree of accuracy). 
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enhance the accuracy of civil commitment evaluations.65  The need for 
judicial scrutiny of the evaluation process might be alleviated to one degree 
or another by the careful dissemination of risk assessment information 
within hospitals.  If hospital administration provided better education to 
clinical staff on this issue, clinicians would engage in more accurate 
examinations of patients.66 
However, as noted, posing a risk of harm to others is but one way a 
mentally ill individual can satisfy a dangerousness requirement.  Indeed, in 
all likelihood, posing a danger to others is not the contention relied upon by 
psychiatrists to justify civil commitment in a majority of instances.67  
Rather, people can put themselves in serious danger of harm by showing:  
an inability to meet their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter;68 an 
inability to meet their medical needs;69 behavior that can provoke others to 
retaliate and use force against the civil commitment subjects;70 or a lack of 
judgment to such a degree the civil commitment subjects may well place 
themselves in a harm-producing situation.71  Unlike assessments of risk to 
others, which are aided by two generations of empirical study,72  judges and 
mental health professionals must wait for the first set of data relating to how 
clinicians can more accurately assess whether mentally ill individuals pose 
a threat of harm to themselves because of an inability to meet their basic 
needs. 
 
65. Borum, supra note 46, at 947. 
66. For example, in Monaco v. Stone, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation 
(HHC) settled a lawsuit that alleged psychiatrists in all facilities in New York state, operated by 
state and local authorities, confined nondangerous patients because psychiatrists wanted to treat 
nondangerous patients whose clinical condition nevertheless warranted inpatient care.  Stipulation 
and Order of Settlement, Monaco v. Carpinello, No. CV-98-3386, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85689, 
at docket entry 326, attachment 1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2006).  This settlement can be viewed at 
http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov through the PACER system, which requires the purchase of a 
PACER number.  In this settlement, HHC agreed to provide education and training to all 
psychiatrists who conducted civil commitment evaluations and directed the initial examining 
physician to evaluate as many as forty-three risk factors relating to violence, suicide, and an 
inability to meet needs, as well as factors that mitigate the risk of harm. Id. 
67. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
68. D.J. v. State, 59 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. App. 2001); Boggs v. New York City Health & 
Hosps. Corp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 71, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). 
69. See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 190 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. App. 2006). 
70. See, e.g., In re Maxwell, 703 P.2d 574, 576 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
71. See, e.g., Boggs, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (addressing a civil commitment subject running into 
traffic); County Attorney v. Kaplan, 605 P.2d 912, 914 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing driving 
the wrong way on a freeway). 
72. See Krauss, supra note 43, at 110. 
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2. Non-Clinical Reasons Why Clinicians Render Inaccurate 
and Unreliable Assessments of Dangerousness 
Numerous reasons exist for a lack of significant proficiency in the area 
of risk assessment that do not relate directly to the evaluation process.  
First, the medical imperative is to presume sickness, and this occurs when 
doctors examine patients for civil commitment purposes.73  When a psychi-
atrist evaluates an individual in a psychiatric emergency room, the nebulous 
criteria for various mental illnesses within the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual–IV often makes it difficult for the subject of the evaluation to rebut 
the presumption of illness that exists when one is brought to the emergency 
room,74 which enables the psychiatrist to find an illness when it does not 
exist.75 
Psychiatrists’ biases toward treatment constitute another reason why 
doctors inaccurately assess the likelihood of harmful behavior: 
Treatment bias refers to the professional attitude that incorrect fail-
ure to treat is a greater error than treating unnecessarily.  Mental 
health professionals are well-meaning clinicians whose whole 
training orients them to find problems and remedy them.  Thus, 
they tend to overdiagnose and overpredict.  This is perhaps 
especially true in the mental health field where there are fewer 
objective criteria of illness and less prognostic knowledge than in 
physical medicine.76 
 
73. Arrigo, supra note 44, at 144.  Hence, it is not surprising one study found when indivi-
duals attempted to facilitate involuntary hospitalization of another person, they often exaggerated 
the dangerousness of the subject of commitment.  When this occurred, psychiatrists assumed the 
behavior set forth in the petition even when the commitment subject denied it and the court later 
found no evidence of such conduct.  Hiday, supra note 5, at 658. 
74. See In re Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 813 (N.D. 1985).  The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual-IV is a text published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) that sets forth the 
criteria the APA has established for various forms of mental illness.  To illustrate the difficulty in 
interpreting behavior as symptomatic of mental illness, one needs to look at some of the criteria 
for mania.  These include the following:  an inflated self-esteem or grandiosity; becoming more 
talkative than usual; an increase in goal-directed activity; and excessive involvement in pleas-
urable activities. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 362 (Am. 
Psych. Ass’n ed., 4th ed. text rev. 2000).  Very often, it is nearly impossible for a psychiatrist 
examining a patient in a psychiatric emergency room to accurately determine whether these 
criteria exist.  At what point does an explanation of a person’s life become grandiose?  How does 
a clinician demarcate the point at which an increase in pleasurable activities becomes symptomatic 
of mental illness? 
75. Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher Williams, Chaos Theory and the Social Control Thesis:  
A Post Foucauldian Analysis of Mental Illness and Involuntary Civil Confinement, 26 SOC. JUST. 
177, 187 (1999). 
76. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science:  An Analysis of Mental Health 
Law, 51 SO. CAL. L. REV. 527, 599 (1978); see also Robert L. Goldstein, Hiring the Hired Gun:  
Lawyers and Their Psychiatric Experts, 11 LEGAL STU. FORUM 41, 41 (1987) (recognizing how 
value systems and ideological leanings can bias what purportedly constitutes an impartial 
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Accordingly, a number of studies have found incorrect assessments of 
harm-causing behavior are a function of doctors labeling an individual 
dangerous as a means of ensuring treatment.77 
Next, a concern for liability can impact a clinician’s decision-making 
in the commitment context because it can create a conflict with the goal of 
committing only those individuals who, after a careful assessment and ap-
plication of clinically appropriate criteria, meet the commitment standard.78  
When this occurs, clinicians err on the side of protection from liability.79 
Beyond a direct fear of liability, psychiatrists are inclined to err on the 
side of safety and caution when assessing dangerousness.80  Physicians are 
trained to act cautiously and to operate under a theory of when in doubt, 
provide treatment.81  The psychiatrist who fails to accurately assess a dan-
gerous patient and authorizes the release or suggests a court release a men-
tally ill individual who subsequently engages in harm-causing behavior will 
be subject to severe criticism.  On the other hand, if the psychiatrist incor-
rectly assesses a nondangerous individual as dangerous, he will suffer no 
consequences.  The psychiatrist’s assessment of likely harm-causing behav-
ior cannot be challenged because no one knows whether harm would have 
occurred if the doctor did not authorize coercive clinical intervention.82  
Thus, both the public and the committing psychiatrist will rarely, if ever, 
 
psychiatric assessment); David B. Wexler & Stanley E. Scoville, The Administration of Psychi-
atric Justice:  Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 100-01 (1973) (stating doctors 
recognize that, while it is probably illegal, they disregard a strict application of the dangerousness 
standard in favor of a “best interests of the patient standard” because they believe it is more 
humanitarian to provide treatment than to be statutorily thwarted in the provision of treatment). 
77. See Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Back to Basics:  A Critical Analysis of 
Dangerousness Research in a New Environment, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 214 (1985) (citing 
Appelbaum & Hamm, supra note 30; John Monahan & Leslie Cummings, The Prediction of 
Dangerousness as a Function of its Perceived Consequences, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 239 (1975)).  
Another study found decisions to commit were influenced primarily by the degree of psychiatric 
impairment manifested and not the level of risk posed by the civil committee.  See Lois Pokorny 
et al., Dangerousness and Disability as Predictors of Psychiatric Patients’ Legal Status, 17 
BEHAV. SCI. L. 253, 264 (1999).  In a different legal setting, one study found a recognition that an 
individual should receive needed treatment impacted assessments of a defendant’s competence to 
stand trial.  See Grant Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 
193, 222 (2004). 
78. Paul Appelbaum, Civil Commitment from a Systems Perspective, 16 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 61, 65 (1992). 
79. Id. at 65-66. 
80. Arrigo & Williams, supra note 75, at 184-90 (stating the “‘better safe than sorry’ climate 
of the medical community is responsible for ceaseless numbers of perfectly harmless individuals 
routinely being diagnosed as ‘dangerous’ and consequently subjected to involuntary confine-
ment”); Arrigo, supra note 44, at 144. 
81. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 57, at 1458 n.85. 
82. See Bernard Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
439, 447 (1974); see also MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348 (noting the decision to release a 
patient can produce disastrous consequences for a clinician who releases a patient who causes 
harm). 
         
276 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:259 
learn about an incorrect assessment of dangerousness, but they will always 
learn about an incorrect assessment of nondangerousness.83 
For these reasons, it is not uncommon for psychiatrists to determine 
civil commitment is warranted for further evaluation of a patient.84  When 
psychiatrists believe it is appropriate to involuntarily hospitalize someone 
when a question exists as to whether a patient meets the civil commitment 
criteria, little incentive exists for the clinician to gather all necessary infor-
mation in the emergency room, which is needed to make a careful assess-
ment.  Rather, doctors can, and will, develop an attitude of commit first, 
and gather all pertinent information later.85  The busier the emergency 
room, the easier it becomes for doctors to develop this attitude. 
The lack of risk assessment training in medical school further adversely 
impacts a doctor’s ability to assess the likelihood of risk-causing behavior.86  
One study found only forty percent of graduate programs offered any for-
mal training in the study of suicide.87  Because diagnosing mental illness 
focuses on symptoms and behaviors that differ from many risk assessment 
criteria, the diagnostic skills a clinician learns in medical school are of 
limited utility when assessing dangerousness.88  Finally, the lack of fluency 
in English of foreign-born doctors and the concomitant inability to fully 
understand statements and to otherwise communicate effectively with the 
individuals they assess contribute to inaccurate assessments of danger.89  
The physician who is unable to grasp the meaning of statements made by 
 
83. Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:  
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 712 n.57 (1974). 
84. Discovery in Monaco v. Hogan, a lawsuit that challenged the adequacy and pretextual 
nature of psychiatric evaluations, illustrates the nature of this problem.  In a review of twenty of 
these involuntarily hospitalized individuals, seven were committed when psychiatrists concluded 
further evaluation was necessary.  Certificate of P.C. dated September 30, 2006; Certificate of 
R.C. dated June 7, 2007; Certificate of M.C. dated June 27, 2008; Certificate of B.C. dated 
February 10, 2006; Certificate of C.O. dated November 9, 2007; Certificate of M.M. dated May 
11, 2007; Certificate of K.S. dated June 6, 2007.  Certifications on file with the author. 
85. In Monaco, the following exchange occurred between counsel and a committing physi-
cian in a deposition in which the physician conceded the prevailing philosophy at his hospital was 
commit first and ask questions later:  “Q. ‘Fair to say you, the prevailing philosophy is certif[y] 
first and then attempt to get the information, one about the patient, and two, alternative forms of 
care and treatment?’ A. ‘Yeah, that’s [the] philosophy, yeah.’”  Declaration of William Brooks, 
Exhibit N at 122-23, Docket Entry 418. 
86. Borum, supra note 46, at 953-54 (noting it is questionable whether the mental health 
profession is adequately training clinicians to properly evaluate an individual’s potential for 
violence). 
87. Id. 
88. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 129 (1984). 
89. See Bradley McGraw et al., Civil Commitment in New York City:  An Analysis of 
Practice, 5 PACE L. REV. 259, 277 (1985); Richard Van Duizend & Joel Zimmerman, The 
Involuntary Civil Commitment Process in Chicago:  Practices and Procedures, 33 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 225, 247 (1984). 
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the patient is likely to misinterpret a patient’s statements and, hence, reach a 
diagnosis that lacks accuracy.90 
C. BEYOND A LACK OF COMPETENCE IN THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
—THE PRETEXTUAL NATURE OF PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS 
As former District of Columbia Circuit Judge David Bazelon found, 
the personal biases of psychiatrists can drive their decision-making.91  The 
excessively vague nature of the concept of danger92 has created an 
opportunity for psychiatrists to ignore, to a very significant degree, the 
constraints the law has attempted to place on their discretion.93  Decisions 
such as O’Connor v. Donaldson and those that imposed more stringent 
substantive commitment standards and provided broader procedural safe-
guards, generated significant hostility from the psychiatric profession; the 
profession viewed judicial decisions that limited their clinical discretion as 
an encroachment on their professional prerogative.94  One psychiatrist 
asserted mentally ill individuals were “[r]otting with their rights on,” a 
phrase that reflected frustration by psychiatrists with being forced to with-
hold treatment they deemed necessary.95  Many psychiatrists believe they 
know best and any limitations placed upon their ability to impose clinically 
indicated treatment, whether imposed by the courts or the legislatures, con-
stitute bad policy that causes more harm than good.96  As one group of 
physicians noted: 
 
90. See McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 277; Van Duizend & Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 
247. 
91. See David L. Bazelon, The Dilemma of Criminal Responsibility, 72 KY. L.J. 263, 274 
(1983-84). 
92. See infra notes 183-214 and accompanying text. 
93. It is fair to ask what difference exists between a decision to commit that is influenced by 
a treatment bias, see supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text, and a pretextual decision that a 
patient is dangerous.  A pretextual decision is more result-oriented; the psychiatrist knows the 
result he or she wants and documents clinical findings that support the result sought when the 
overarching goal of the evaluation is to determine whether the patient’s clinical condition warrants 
inpatient treatment.  A commitment decision unduly influenced by treatment bias is less dishonest.  
Physicians may not realize biases they have are impacting the decisions they must make. 
94. See MICHAEL PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE 85 (Bruce D. Sales et al. eds., 2000). 
95. Eastman, supra note 44, at 315; see also MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 816 n.271 
(“[M]ental health professionals perceive legalistic laws as an unnecessary constraint in the 
treatment of mentally ill persons.”). 
96. As one psychiatrist noted, “The need to demonstrate dangerousness . . . promotes a 
galling kind of hypocrisy when, in order to effect a necessary commitment, dangerousness must 
be invented or exaggerated.” Paul Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill as a 
Moral Issue, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 384, 386 (1984); see also Rael Jean Isaac, Protect the 
Mentally Ill From Their Advocates, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1991, at A22; H. Richard Lamb, 
Involuntary Treatment of the Homeless Mentally Ill, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
269, 277 (1989); Norko, supra note 46, at 288 (stating the dangerousness requirement should be 
changed to a criterion that better supports clinical reality in which doctors act like doctors); Darold 
Treffert, The Obviously Ill Patient in Need of Treatment:  A Fourth Standard for Civil Commi-
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Emergency involuntary hospitalization procedures have become 
adversary in form and function, with lawyers who have no training 
in psychiatry whatsoever forcing their views on doctors who have 
an entirely different perspective in their approach to the mentally 
ill . . . .  They should leave the practice of psychiatry to those who 
have had experience in the field—not on or around the bench.97 
Comments like this reflect a view of some psychiatrists that attempts by 
lawyers to strengthen individual rights in the civil commitment process 
amount to a “legal onslaught” or “holy legal war” against the system of 
public psychiatry.98 
Psychiatrists are authoritarian in nature and more comfortable with 
compulsory treatment than nonmedical mental health professionals;99 they 
support broader grounds for commitment than other mental health profes-
sionals.100  The authoritarian nature of many psychiatrists has produced a 
value system that de-emphasizes individual liberty and autonomy.  The au-
thoritarian nature of many psychiatrists has produced a hostility and dis-
respect for those laws that have broadened the rights of civil committees.101  
When stricter commitment laws conflict with deeply held values of 
psychiatrists, the doctors give preference to their values at the expense of 
compliance with the law.102  Indeed, one set of authorities gathering exten-
sive literature has concluded, “The often flagrant failure to apply the legal 
standards for civil commitment has been documented in numerous 
jurisdictions.”103 
The nebulous nature of the dangerousness requirement has enabled 
psychiatrists to disregard the law while creating an appearance of 
adherence.  A finding of danger, unlike most other legal determinations, 
does not require a conclusion that a particular act took place.  Rather, a 
psychiatrist need only conclude threat of harm is substantial enough to 
warrant confinement.104  The psychiatrist who wishes to pay lip service to 
the law, if for no other reason than to satisfy his or her conscience, can 
 
tment, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 259, 264 (1985) (“Changes in mental health law 
have produced a pendulum swing . . . too harsh, too restrictive, and too unyielding.”). 
97. Glenn C. Affleck, Michael A. Peszke & Ronald M. Wintrob, Psychiatrists’ Familiarity 
with Legal Statutes Governing Emergency Involuntary Hospitalization, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
205, 209 (1978). 
98. Arrigo, supra note 44, at 147. 
99. See Eastman, supra note 44, at 344. 
100. Robert Brooks, Psychiatrists’ Beliefs and Wants About Involuntary Civil Commitment 
Grounds, 29 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 13, 14 (2006). 
101. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
102. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65. 
103. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 815 n.270. 
104. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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always assert enough symptoms of mental illness or factors relating to 
harm-causing behavior exist to justify confinement.105  The psychiatrist 
who lacks respect for the law can simply act with impunity, knowing the 
court system will rarely second guess his or her determination.  Moreover, 
relatively few individuals who suffer from mental illness have the 
wherewithal or fortuity to find counsel who will file a damages lawsuit 
when the facility, or in rare instances a court, releases a patient.106  In sum, 
psychiatrists can engage in what can be fairly characterized as systematic 
civil disobedience—continuing to hospitalize those individuals whose 
clinical conditions they believe warrant in-patient treatment. 
Numerous studies strongly suggest psychiatrists have flaunted the laws 
that supposedly govern their clinical discretion by making assessments of 
danger that are pretextual in nature.  After commitment laws narrowed in 
one jurisdiction, a physician reportedly stated, “Doctors will continue to 
certify those whom they really believe should be certified; they will merely 
learn a new language.”107  Studies of psychiatric admissions in many juris-
dictions that promulgated stricter commitment standards substantiate this 
contention. 
Studies on the impact of commitment statutes suggest the statutes have 
not had an impact on the number of admissions.108  An immediate decline 
in involuntary admissions followed the passage of tighter commitment 
statutes in Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas, Nebraska, North Carolina, and 
Ontario, Canada.109  However, these jurisdictions reported an increase in 
involuntary commitments in the second and subsequent years.110  Similar 
reversals occurred in Florida, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Texas, and Washington.111   
Minnesota and California experienced an initial increase, and only 
Massachusetts and Michigan sustained decreases in involuntary hospitali-
zations.112  Studies further indicated these reversals could not be attributed 
to more frequent readmissions of patients who may have been released as a 
 
105. See Grant Morris, Defining Dangerousness:  Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 88 (1999) (noting how clinicians “apply their own, unchallenged 
notions of committability to confine those who are deemed to need treatment”). 
106. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
107. William O. McCormick, Involuntary Commitment in Ontario:  Some Barriers to the 
Provision of Proper Care, 124 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 715, 717 (1981). 
108. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349. 
109. R. Michael Bagby et al., Decision Making in Psychiatric Commitment:  An 
Experimental Analysis, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 28, 28 (1991). 
110. Id. at 29. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
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result of the implementation of tighter commitment standards.113  Hence, as 
one authority found after studying admissions subsequent to amended com-
mitment statutes, as many as half the committed individuals failed to satisfy 
the criteria for commitment.114 
Scrutiny of the details of the commitment process helps to clarify how 
and why stricter commitment statutes do not produce fewer admissions.  
Many authorities have found a desire to provide treatment, and not an inten-
tion to adhere to and apply the governing legal criteria, motivates decisions 
by physicians who decide to hospitalize mentally ill individuals.115  It is not 
difficult to reach this conclusion because studies detail a patient’s clinical 
status, rather than an honest application of legal criteria, which drives 
commitment decision-making.116  When this occurs, physicians will use an 
assessment of dangerousness as a post-hoc justification for treatment.117  If 
the ticket to involuntary hospitalization is an assessment of danger, “many 
 
113. See Bagby, supra note 17, at 391. 
114. Joseph Frueh, Note, The Anders Brief in Appeals from Civil Commitment, 118 YALE 
L.J. 272, 303 (2008). 
115. See Bagby et al., supra note 109, at 29, 32 (discussing a study that found highly treat-
able individuals are more likely to be committed than individuals characterized as not very 
treatable); Renee L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, Some Issues in Psychiatry, Psychology, and the 
Law, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1192 (2008) (noting hospitalization can be viewed as an opportunity 
to provide needed treatment).  One study found psychiatrists are more likely to recommend 
involuntary hospitalization when a patient suffers from schizophrenia or bipolar disorder than sub-
stance abuse.  Brooks, supra note 100, at 14.  Any study that finds that the diagnosis of a patient 
serves as a basis for the decision to commit, as opposed to the level of risk posed by the patient, 
suggests an interest in treating individuals with a particular diagnosis influences the commitment 
decision-making process.  See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65 (stating a desire to help those 
perceived to be in need provides an explanation for what authorities have demonstrated:  mental 
health professional prioritize personal values over legal standards when conflict between the two 
exists); Stewart Page, New Civil Commitment Legislation:  The Relevance of Commitment 
“Criteria”, 25 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 646, 646 (1980) (considering a study that found approxi-
mately seventy percent of commitments did not meet statutory criteria). 
116. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65; Bagby, supra note 17, at 385 (stating studies in 
one jurisdiction found physicians failed to determine civil committees met the legal requirements 
under the commitment provisions between eighty and ninety percent of the time in which the 
physicians certified patients for involuntary hospitalization); Bagby et al., supra note 109, at 32 
(noting twenty percent of patients that physicians recommended for commitment did not meet 
legal criteria for involuntary hospitalization); Judith S. Thompson & Joel W. Ager, An 
Experimental Analysis of the Civil Commitment Recommendations of Psychologists and 
Psychiatrists, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 119, 120 (1988) (discussing that empirical studies of physi-
cian’s familiarity with relevant statutes, or lack thereof, and adequacy of physician certification 
forms support the contention that an application of commitment standards does not necessarily 
govern psychiatrists’ decisions to seek commitment); see also Michael J. Leiber et al., A 
Comparison of Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Civil Commitment Decisionmaking in Dane County 
Wisconsin, 20 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT, 1, 22-23 (1993) (finding continued 
adherence to clinical concerns in part to paternalistic considerations underlying commitment 
decisions that the court in Lessard v. Schmidt sought to eliminate). 
117. Mulvey & Lidz, supra note 77, at 217. 
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psychiatrists . . . are willing to punch it.”118  In summary, when a psychi-
atrist evaluates a patient in the civil commitment context, a presumption of 
illness exists,119 and if the patient fails to rebut this presumption, it may 
well be that the clinician then applies a near irrefutable presumption of 
dangerousness. 
The conclusory nature and concomitant lack of detailed objective 
criteria with much of the psychiatric diagnostic process enables psychi-
atrists to support assessments of danger when the patient’s mental status 
would not justify this conclusion.120  To illustrate, the presence of paranoia 
is a risk factor for danger.121  The psychiatric profession defines paranoia as 
a pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are 
interpreted as malevolent.122  A civil committee may say his doctor is 
“against” him or her because the patient wants to be released but the doctor 
has decided otherwise.  The doctor knows he or she is trying to help the 
patient because he or she recognizes mental illness that requires treatment.  
Accordingly, the doctor may conclude the patient manifests a false belief 
system of a persecutory nature.  When an honest application of legal criteria 
no longer serves as the sole criteria for application of civil commitment 
laws, not only does a desire to help and the patient’s clinical condition 
influence dangerousness assessments, but so do other factors unrelated to 
the assessment process.  These include the availability of bed space and 
insurance.123 
How many psychiatrists assess numerous symptoms of mental illness, 
such as delusions and hallucinations, illustrates how psychiatrists can 
manipulate the diagnostic process to find danger where none exists.  Profes-
sional literature has made clear no necessary correlation exists between the 
presence of delusions or hallucinations and a heightened risk of harm.124  
On the other hand, particular delusions and command hallucinations height-
en the risk of harm posed by a person with mental illness.125  Psychiatrists 
 
118. JOHN MONAHAN, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF 
VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 51 (1981). 
119. See Arrigo & Williams, supra note 75, at 187. 
120. See Douglas Mossman, “Hired Guns,” “Whores,” and “Prostitutes”:  Case Law 
References to Clinicians of Ill Repute, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 414 (1999) 
(recognizing psychiatrists can mold testimony to further the litigation objectives of the party on 
whose behalf the expert is testifying). 
121. CHRISTOPHER WEBSTER ET AL., HCR-20:  ASSESSING RISK FOR VIOLENCE 54 (1997). 
122. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 100 (7th ed. 1994). 
123. Nancy B. Engleman et al., Clinicians’ Decision Making About Involuntary 
Commitment, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 941, 943-44 (1998); Herbert Sacks, Who’s on First, 
What’s on Second, I Don’t Know’s on Third (For Profit Psychiatric Hospital Chains and the 
Games They Play), PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Sept. 5, 1997, at 3. 
124. See, e.g., Harris & Rice, supra note 59, at 1169. 
125. Id. 
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can, and will, justify a finding of danger on the basis that a patient mani-
fests delusions or hallucinations, without specifying whether the delusions 
or hallucinations are risk-enhancing.126 
Tellingly, studies have documented a “remarkable degree of igno-
rance” of commitment criteria.127  Significantly, those psychiatrists who 
certified the largest number of patients for involuntary hospitalization were 
among the least knowledgeable about the law.128  If psychiatrists who 
commit individuals are ignorant of the law, then considerations other than 
the legal criteria that should govern their decisions guide their assessment 
process.  The handful of damages cases the author has worked on illustrates 
 
126. Evidence presented in Monaco v. Hogan is instructive on this issue.  See generally 
Monaco v. Hogan, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).  In Monaco, the plaintiffs argued 
psychiatrists confined individuals—regardless of whether the individuals were actually danger-
ous—for the purpose of providing needed treatment, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 351.  In other words, some certifications of dangerousness are pretextual. 
Discovery in Monaco revealed clinicians acknowledged that an intent to act on delusions or a 
history of acting on delusions heightened the risk of harm even though delusions in and of them-
selves did not.  See Declaration of William Brooks, Exhibit L at 126, 156, 198, Exhibit O at 42-
43, Exhibit P at 36, 70, Exhibit S at 69-71, Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (No. CV-98-3386), 
available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov (search for “CV-98-3386”; then follow “Docket Entry 
418”).  Notwithstanding what should have constituted a need to differentiate between risk 
enhancing delusions and hallucinations and delusions and hallucinations that were not, when the 
plaintiffs came forth with voluminous instances of the failure of clinicians to make these 
distinctions, see Declaration of William Brooks, Exhibit V, Exhibit W, Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 
335 (No. CV-98-3386), available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov (search for “CV-98-3386”; 
then follow “Docket Entry 418”), the Office of Mental Health failed to come forth with one 
instance in which a doctor who conducted a civil commitment evaluation justified a finding of 
dangerousness based on a particular risk enhancing delusion or hallucination, as opposed to 
finding dangerousness based on delusions or hallucinations in general.  See Declaration of 
Michael Peeples, Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (No. CV-98-3386), available at http://www. 
nyed.uscourts.gov (search for “CV-98-3386”; then follow “Docket Entry 418”).  Despite this 
evidence, the court held because hospital physicians gave legitimate reasons for making 
commitment decisions, the plaintiffs failed to prove their claim of pretextual confinement. 
Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 353-54.  The court further held the decisions of the physicians to 
commit did not violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause because the 
commitments did not shock the conscience. Id. at 349-51.  The court adopted the shocks the 
conscience standard to ensure physicians can operate effectively when examining patients. Id. at 
351.  To the extent the court found any commitment of a nondangerous person is lawful as long it 
does not shock the conscience, the court clearly erred.  See Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 144-
45 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting the shocks the conscience standard in general and the Monaco court’s 
decision as establishing the proper substantive due process framework for civil commitment).  By 
justifying the adoption of the shocks the conscience standard on the need to permit physicians to 
operate effectively, the court conflated the governing substantive due process standard, which 
prohibits the confinement of a nondangerous mentally ill individual and considerations underlying 
the qualified immunity defense.  See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352 (2006). 
127. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65.  In one study where doctors’ knowledge of 
commitment laws was explored, some thought patients must present an immediate, clear, or 
imminent danger to self or others, while other doctors thought patients are committable if they 
present a probable, possible, or potential danger; still other physicians thought only homicidal or 
suicidal patients could be certified for emergency hospitalization, and self-destructive tendencies 
could be a basis for commitment.  See Affleck, Peszke & Wintrob, supra note 97, at 208. 
128. See Affleck, Peszke & Wintrob, supra note 97, at 208. 
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the problematic nature of the psychiatric evaluation process.  Invariably, 
questions have arisen about the seriousness of purpose in which one or 
more clinicians have attempted to gather information from the plaintiff129 or 
the adequacy of the evaluation as a result of the amount of time one or more 
committing physicians has spent evaluating the plaintiff.130 
Psychiatrists who examine individuals to determine whether they meet 
a state’s civil commitment criteria have been designated by society to 
temporarily replace the role of judges and become impartial factfinders who 
must determine whether enough facts exists to deprive someone of a 
fundamental liberty interest.131  When psychiatrists lack knowledge of the 
law they must apply, no question exists that when committing individuals, 
the psychiatrists think less about the legal constraints that must govern their 
decision-making and more about other considerations they deem more 
important than legal criteria.132  The attempts by the psychiatric profession 
 
129. See, e.g., Declaration at ¶¶ 7-9, Jacob v. Bon Secours Charity Health System, Inc., No. 
02 Civ. 1398 (BSJ) (RLE), 2008 WL 2216275 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2008) (detailing a lack of 
interest in gathering information from the plaintiff after one physician discussed the case with the 
plaintiff’s husband) (on file with author). 
130. See Joint Appendix at 395, Marion v. LaFargue, 05-3797-cv, 186 Fed. Apps. 96 (2d Cir. 
2006) (including a concession by the initial committing physician he may have spent as little as 
five minutes evaluating the plaintiff) (on file with author); Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 
67 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating the initial committing physician conducted a five minute interview); 
Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1056 (2d Cir. 1995) (committing physician met 
with the plaintiff for ten minutes); Bolmer v. Oliveira, 570 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(stating plaintiff alleged the certifying physician met with him for a few minutes and the admitting 
physician for five minutes); Tewksbury v. Dowling, 169 F. Supp. 2d 103, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(stating plaintiff asserted certifying physician never evaluated her; physician asserted he did so for 
five minutes); Lubera v. Jewish Ass’n for Servs. for the Aged, No. 95 CIV. 7845 (DLC), 1996 
WL 426375, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1996) (indicating plaintiff was admitted to the hospital, as 
evidenced by being thrown into shower, prior to any evaluation by a physician). 
Demarco v. Sadiker, 897 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), is particularly illuminating.  In 
Demarco, the plaintiff opposed a summary judgment motion on the ground that one of the 
physicians never evaluated him and submitted an affidavit making this assertion. Id. at 703.  The 
defendant, citing, inter alia, a detailed admission note, and failing to recognize the contents of 
such could have been produced by copying other documents, argued the plaintiff’s assertion was 
simply too incredible for the court to believe. Id. at 703.  Nevertheless, the court denied the physi-
cian qualified immunity and directed the parties to conduct limited discovery. Id. at 703-04.  
During the deposition of the admitting physician, he acknowledged he first met the plaintiff at 
12:45 p.m.  See Declaration of Patricia Hingerton, Exhibit A, Demarco, 897 F. Supp. 693 (No. 93-
CV-5938 (ARR)).  A review of the commitment certificate signed by the physician detailed that 
the physician committed the plaintiff at 12:45 p.m., the time the physician first observed the 
plaintiff. Id., Exhibit 4.  When questioned about the certification of the plaintiff at the moment the 
physician first observed him, the physician responded the plaintiff was angry, agitated, and 
paranoid, and that the plaintiff threatened to sue on the ground of false imprisonment. Id. at 76.  If 
the handful of cases the author has litigated invariably contain evidence of significant deficiencies 
with the evaluation process, and if one extrapolates to the approximate one million involuntary 
hospitalizations that occur annually, see supra note 1 and accompanying text, one can imagine the 
number of problematic evaluations that occur each year. 
131. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992). 
132. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65. 
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to involuntarily hospitalize nondangerous individuals have been described 
as a “blatant attempt to aggregate power, to subvert the law, and to privilege 
expertise over all competing social values.”133  In the 1950s, when school 
administrators attempted to flout the integration requirements imposed by 
the Supreme Court, their civil disobedience made news headlines, and 
many within the country, including courts and the news media, eventually 
denounced what amounted to an attempt to elevate what school officials 
believed constituted the proper set of values over the rule of law.134  Many 
psychiatrists have done the same with little outcry.  Leaving aside the 
culpability of the psychiatrists who have subverted the law, fault also lies 
with lawyers for civilly committed individuals and with the judges who 
have abdicated their judicial decision-making role to the purported experts 
who appear before them. 
IV. THE INABILITY OF CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARINGS TO 
SERVE AS A CHECK ON FAULTY 
PSYCHIATRIC DECISION-MAKING 
A. THE DEFERENCE TO PSYCHIATRISTS BY JUDGES 
The role a psychiatrist plays in the civil commitment process is truly 
sui generis.  When psychiatrists enter a courtroom, they are often defending 
their decisions to involuntarily hospitalize a mentally ill individual.  When 
this occurs, the psychiatrists, for all intents and purposes, is the real party in 
interest.135  In instances when the psychiatric expert testifies in connection 
with a patient whom another psychiatrist has decided to hospitalize, the 
expert testifies on behalf of a fellow doctor, an individual with whom the 
testifying expert no doubt has significant professional, if not also personal, 
contact.  In either case, a substantial potential for bias exists.136  However, 
the testifying psychiatrist also assumes the role of an “expert,” a witness 
with specialized knowledge, upon whom the court must rely for an in-
formed decision.137  As detailed below, this anomaly results in courts 
inappropriately deferring to psychiatric “expertise.” 
Notwithstanding the tightening of psychiatric standards, judges 
typically defer to psychiatric judgments that a committed person meets the 
 
133. PERLIN, supra note 94, at 90. 
134. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1958). 
135. See Robert S. Berger, The Psychiatric Expert as a Due Process Decisionmaker, 33 
BUFF. L. REV. 681, 702 (1985). 
136. See Binder & McNeil, supra note 115, at 1197 (noting advocacy associated with a 
treating role renders it difficult for clinicians to act impartially and objectively). 
137. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 69-70 (6th ed. 2006). 
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criteria for civil commitment.138  Clinicians’ opinions about mental illness 
and danger are dispositive in commitment hearings regardless of the partic-
ular commitment standard used; studies indicate the concordance rate, i.e., 
the rate of correlation between clinicians’ opinions and factfinders’ opin-
ions, range between ninety and one hundred percent.139  Approximately 
thirty years ago, one authority described civil commitment proceedings as 
ceremonial in nature, in which courts “rubber stamp” expert conclusions.140  
However, the perfunctory nature of civil commitment proceedings remains 
today, more than twenty-five years after the Supreme Court decided 
O’Connor v. Donaldson, and three-judge courts imposed supposedly strin-
gent procedural safeguards.141  When judges defer to psychiatrists at a rate 
between ninety and one hundred percent of the time the psychiatrist experts 
actually become the decision-makers in the civil commitment process. 
Numerous reasons exist for this excessive deference by judges.  First, 
most jurisdictions give judges little or no training in mental health law or 
the finer points of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.142  Accordingly, 
 
138. See Grant H. Morris, “Let’s Do the Time Warp Again”:  Assessing the Competence of 
Counsel in Mental Health Conservatorship Proceedings, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283, 314-15 
(2009); Bagby, supra note 17, at 385 (“[Li]ngering deference to psychiatric recommendation, 
commitment without evidence of facts of dangerousness.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also 
David L. Bazelon, The Dilemma of Criminal Responsibility, 72 KY. L.J. 263, 267 (1983-84) 
(asserting judges prefer to delegate difficult decision-making to psychiatric experts). 
139. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349.  In reaching this conclusion, the authors relied in 
part on a study in Iowa that found civil commitment hearings served as little more than a rubber 
stamp of physicians’ opinions. Id. at 319; see also Harold J. Bursztajn, Robert M. Hamm & 
Thomsas G. Gutheil, Beyond the Black Letter of the Law:  An Empirical Study of an Individual 
Judge’s Decision Process for Civil Commitment Hearings, 25 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 
7982, 7982-83 (1997) (noting in Massachusetts, a court ordered committed every patient who 
psychiatrists petitioned for commitment; a second study in Colorado found judges committed 
twenty-four of twenty-seven patients whom psychiatrists petitioned for commitment); Morris, 
supra note 138, at 329-30, 332 (2009) (stating courts granted applications for conservatorships, 
proceedings tantamount to civil commitment in California, in 97.9% of cases; in each case, 
counsel introduced psychiatric testimony); William Hoffman Pincus, Note, Civil Commitment and 
the “Great Confinement” Revisited:  Straightjacketing Individual Rights, Stifling Culture, 36 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1769, 1806-08 (1995) (discussing an empirical evaluation that found an almost 
ninety percent correlation rate between psychiatric testimony and judicial dispositions); Winick, 
supra note 3, at 41-42 (stating the concordance rate most frequently exceeds ninety-five percent).  
The rate of correlation detailed by the authors in the 1990s hardly differed for the rate of correla-
tion found in the 1960s and 1970s.  See Virginia A. Hiday, Application of the Dangerousness 
Standard in Civil Commitment, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 277 (1981) (noting numerous studies 
detail how courts deferred to psychiatrists for judgments of dangerousness and, hence, abrogate 
their decision-making responsibility); Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Mental Health Expert Testimony:  
Current Problems, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L., 201, 213 (1977) (stating in six studies of civil 
commitment hearings between 1964 and 1972, the correlation between expert testimony and 
judges’ decisions ranged from ninety-six to one hundred percent).  In the hearings from which the 
author gathered information, the concordance rate from all localities was 86.3%.  This ranged 
from 66.6% in Queens County, New York, to 100 % in Dade County, Florida. 
140. Poythress, supra note 139, at 211. 
141. See Eastman, supra note 44, at 322. 
142. Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 66. 
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judges defer to psychiatric opinion because they feel they lack the requisite 
expertise to independently assess whether patients meet the statutory 
criteria for commitment. 143  Furthermore, judges do not want to stand in the 
way of clinicians providing treatment to those deemed in need of care.144  
Hence, judges lack interest in scrutinizing the substance of expert testimony 
when scrutiny compels a finding that a patient does not meet the civil 
commitment standards.145  In this way, a desire to not interfere with needed 
care often results in a lack of interest in applying governing legal 
standards.146 
Finally, a paternalistic, non-adversarial approach to the civil commit-
ment process constitutes the safest course of action for judges.  Just as the 
release of a patient who causes harm can produce horrible consequences for 
the doctor who released the patient, a judge who releases a patient who 
harms another person after release will likely suffer the same fate.147  
However, the acceptance of psychiatric testimony at face value at the 
expense of an honest application commitment standards amounts to judges 
acting as enforcers of a societal morality that believes it is better to both err 
on the side of caution and provide treatment to those who are deemed to 
need it than it is to carefully apply governing law that impacts on funda-
mental rights.148  For these judges, reliance upon expert testimony provides 
a basis for a decision that can often withstand appellate scrutiny.  The 
affirmance of a trial court’s decision relying on unsubstantiated expert testi-
mony is most likely to occur when little factual basis exists to disprove the 
unsubstantiated opinion.  When commitment hearings lack vigorous advo-
cacy on behalf of the patient, chances increase that an appellate court will 
not have a detailed factual record that will either substantiate or disprove an 
 
143. Hiday, supra note 5, at 665. 
144. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348-49 (stating when attorneys acted in adversarial 
fashion, judges made clear such advocacy did not impact their decision-making process if the 
goals of legal advocacy conflicted with the opinions of the medical experts); see also Hiday, supra 
note 139, at 288 (arguing courts exhibit an impulse to move beyond rigid, formal legal process 
and consider the whole person); Hiday, supra note 5, at 651. 
145. See Richard Rogers, The Uncritical Acceptance of Risk Assessment in Forensic 
Practice, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 595, 602 (2000) (discussing a number of authorities have 
convincingly demonstrated triers of fact do not accurately utilize probabilistic estimates, even 
when the estimates are carefully explained). 
146. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348; see also Michael J. Saks, Expert Witnesses, 
Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 293 (1990) 
(detailing the acknowledgement of a judge to law students that he authorized the commitment of 
individuals who did not meet commitment criteria because of a desire to facilitate needed 
treatment). 
147. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349. 
148. See Arrigo & Williams, supra note 75, at 184-87. 
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opinion rendered by a psychiatric expert.  As detailed below, vigorous ef-
forts at representation often do not exist. 
B. OTHER FAILURES OF THE SUPPOSED ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
While many federal and state courts imposed numerous, supposedly 
stringent, substantive and procedural protections in the 1970s and 80s,149 
the failure of a narrowing of commitment statutes to result in a decrease in 
the number of commitments suggests tighter standards and procedures have 
not been applied in practice.150  Court hearings were supposed to serve as a 
check on psychiatric decision-making; all too often they have not.151  
Responsibility for this failure lies, to a significant degree, with attorneys 
who represent patients in commitment proceedings but who have shirked 
their responsibility to act as effective advocates for their clients.152  Instead 
of rigorous advocacy by attorneys, norms of cooperation and accommoda-
tion typically govern the civil commitment process.153  Notwithstanding the 
tightening of psychiatric standards, attorneys who represent civil commit-
tees often act in a passive, nonadversarial, or perfunctory manner.154  Some 
attorneys come unprepared to represent their client,155 accept at face value 
the conclusions of psychiatric experts without even the slightest degree of 
skepticism,156 and otherwise fail to effectively participate in the hearing.157 
The lack of an adversarial role of civil committees’ attorneys and the 
concomitant informal nature of commitment proceedings can be evinced in 
a comparison between how attorneys present and challenge evidence of 
 
149. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text. 
150. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348.  
151. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 138, at 329-41; Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 53, at 646-
48. 
152. See Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My 
Trial”:  Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, 28 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 241 (2008) (“If there has been any constant in modern mental 
disability law in its thirty-five year history, it is the near universal reality that counsel assigned to 
represent individuals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective.”); Winick, 
supra note 3, at 41 (recognizing the failure of attorneys to fulfill their adversarial role has turned 
commitment hearings “into a farce and a mockery in which . . . judges appear to ‘rubber stamp’ 
the recommendations of clinical expert witnesses”); see generally Michael L. Perlin, Fatal 
Assumption:  A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 39, 39 (1992). 
153. Arrigo, supra note 44, at 144. 
154. Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 66; Bagby, supra note 17, at 385 (internal quotations 
omitted). 
155. See McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 285; see also Poythress, supra note 139, at 210-11. 
156. See Hiday, supra note 139, at 287 (noting in one study, seldom did the patient’s counsel 
challenge the psychiatrist’s assertions of dangerousness set forth in doctors’ affidavits, even 
though in ten percent of cases, the affidavits did not contain the legally required facts detailing 
imminent danger). 
157. See Morris, supra note 138, at 330-32. 
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dangerousness in commitment proceedings involving sexual offenders and 
commitment proceedings of individuals who suffer from mental illness.  
Extensive case law exists that has arisen out of attempts to offer actuarial or 
other empirically-based evidence of danger in sexual offender proceed-
ings.158  The testimony results in clinicians offering opinion on the specific 
probability of a committee engaging in future acts of sexual violence.159  It 
may well be that attorneys representing the state rely on actuarial evidence 
because mental health professionals recognize that clinical judgment alone 
results in assessments of danger with questionable validity while the 
clinically adjusted actuarial method has been considered the most accurate 
method of assessing risk.160  The adversarial nature of the proceedings 
require attorneys to put forth evidence that has the best chance of with-
standing vigorous cross-examination. 
In the civil commitment context, instances of vigorous cross-examina-
tion often generate hostility from both judges and psychiatric witnesses.161  
Judges often discourage zealous advocacy and make clear vigorous repre-
sentation does not impact the decision-making process when the position 
put forth by counsel controverts the opinions put forth by psychiatric 
experts.162  As a result, attorneys will limit their advocacy efforts to what 
they believe judges will tolerate.163  That psychiatrists do not generally 
complain about intensive cross-examination in other legal contexts164 may 
well mean the general lack of adversarialness in the civil commitment 
context has created an expectation that patients’ lawyers should play only a 
perfunctory role in the commitment process.  Perhaps that is why patients’ 
attorneys rarely call more than two witnesses and frequently call none.165  
When attorneys fail to present a fully competent case, those judges who 
 
158. See, e.g., In re Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 616 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002); People v. Taylor, 782 
N.E.2d 920, 923-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 77-80 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Dean, No. 17320-8-III, 2000 WL 690142, at *2 (Wash. App. 
May 30, 2000). 
159. See, e.g., Dean, No. 17320-8-III, 2000 WL 690142, at *2. 
160. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
161. Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 152, at 52. 
162. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 66; MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349; see also 
Winick, supra note 3, at 42; Perlin, supra note 152, at 44 n.33 (stating judges, often in anger, 
rebuff vigorous cross-examinations). 
163. Frueh, supra note 114, at 306-07. 
164. Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 152, at 52. 
165. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348; see also Morris, supra note 138, at 330-31 (in 
forty-three of forty-seven hearings, the commitment subject served as the only witness for his 
side; in only one case did the attorney for the commitment subject present a witness other than the 
commitment subject).  In the seventy-six hearings about which the author gathered data, the 
patient’s lawyer failed to call any witnesses fourteen times, called one witness forty-seven times, 
two witnesses twelve times, and three witnesses three times.  Of the forty-seven times in which a 
lawyer called one witness only, the patient was the only witness called forty-one times. 
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carefully attempt to apply legal criteria lack the ability to adequately assess 
the merits of the hospital’s position seeking confinement.166  Judges tend to 
lack knowledge of the weak basis for psychiatric testimony.167  Hence, the 
failure of lawyers to vigorously represent their clients in civil commitment 
proceedings results in even well-intentioned judges failing to learn about 
the weaknesses of psychiatric testimony.168  Moreover, while judges give 
great deference to psychiatric opinions,169 and psychiatrists appearing in 
court invariably testify on behalf of the committing hospital,170 attorneys 
infrequently seek independent psychiatric testimony.171 
In addition, many commitment hearings have evolved into proceedings 
that are not accusatorial in nature, but rather inquisitorial.172  The com-
mitting hospital will occasionally call the patient as a witness in hopes that 
the patient will “hang himself.”  This is done when a hospital fails to pre-
sent a strong case in support of hospitalization.173 
The failure of the hospital to put on a persuasive case can occur when 
the patient’s treating physician is a foreign-born doctor who lacks fluency 
in English.  Some facilities have found a solution to this problem through 
the use of a professional witness, i.e., a physician who testifies regularly for 
the hospital while not necessarily serving as a certified or treating doctor for 
any particular patient.  This type of witness usually makes a much better 
witness than the typical doctor.  This witness is more familiar with civil 
commitment law and knows how to present psychiatric testimony in a man-
ner that is useful for the court.174  This witness quickly learns what evidence 
 
166. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 67. 
167. Hiday, supra note 5, at 655. 
168. Id.  Vigorous advocacy should result in attempts to educate the court about weaknesses 
in psychiatric assessments of dangerousness through cross-examination.  However, when psychia-
trists are so lacking in professional expertise they are ignorant of the well-documented weaknesses 
in expert testimony, then the lawyer loses the ability to effectively educate the court through 
cross-examination.  When this occurs, the lawyer must rely on a court-appointed expert to elicit 
testimony about the weaknesses in expert testimony. 
169. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
170. See McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 289. 
171. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349 (citing Serena D. Stier & Kurt J. Stoebe, 
Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa:  The Failure of the 1975 Legislation, 64 
IOWA L. REV. 1284 (1979) (discussing how one study in Iowa found that patients’ attorneys failed 
to request the appointment of an independent expert in more than ninety-nine percent of cases)); 
see also Morris, supra note 138, at 330-31 (noting that in none of forty-seven contested cases did 
the attorney for the commitment subject seek an appointment of a psychiatrist).  Two reasons exist 
for this failure.  First, lawyers fear the court-appointed expert will render the same opinions as the 
expert testifying for the hospital. McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 278.  Second, any appointment 
of an independent psychiatrist will delay the proceeding, which serves as a major disincentive to 
seek the appointment of an expert. Van Duizend & Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 246. 
172. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349. 
173. Van Duizend & Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 261. 
174. Id. at 258. 
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judges find persuasive;175 he can turn the psychiatric evaluation into a 
quasi-interrogation, enabling him to gather evidence that buttresses the 
hospital’s position that the patient is mentally ill and dangerous.  The non-
treating psychiatrist can help eliminate problems that might plague the 
hospital’s case, due to lack of preparation, by asking the patient information 
contained in the hospital record or provided by individuals familiar with the 
patient.  Particularly because patients cannot refuse to answer questions,176 
the non-treating psychiatrist can use statements made by the patient as 
admissions. 
In sum, one author of an empirical study concluded data on the civil 
commitment process in California confirms what the Montana Supreme 
Court held:  the civil commitment process “is an ‘obvious systematic 
failure’ ‘that routinely accepts—and even requires—an unreasonably low 
standard of legal assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial 
confrontation.’”177  The combination of the abdication of one’s adversary 
role by attorneys, the substantial deference paid by courts to psychiatrists, 
and the use of hearsay in lieu of testimony subject to cross-examination 
creates the potential for the deprivation of liberty based on hearings that last 
very brief periods of time.178 
 
175. See Hiday & Smith, supra note 53, at 441-42 (examining dangerous behavior). 
176. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), courts 
were split as to whether civil committees could assert the privilege against self-incrimination to 
refuse to answer questions posed to them by psychiatrists.  Compare Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 
F. Supp. 1113, 1130-32 (D. Haw. 1976) (holding the privilege against self-incrimination attaches 
in civil commitment proceedings); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394 (D. Ala. 1974); 
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101 (D. Wis. 1972); with French v. Blackburn, 428 F. 
Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (D.N.C. 1977), aff’d, 443 U.S. 901 (1977) (holding the privilege against self-
incrimination does not attach in civil commitment proceedings); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 
202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (W. Va. 1974).  In Allen, the Supreme Court held a committee subject to 
confinement pursuant to a sexual delinquency proceeding deemed civil in nature could not assert 
the privilege. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375.  Since Allen, there have been very few cases in which a civil 
committee asserted the privilege against self-incrimination; in the few cases that have addressed 
the issue, courts have held the privilege does not attach to civil commitment proceedings.  See 
Goetz v. Crosson, 728 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Ughetto v. Acrish, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398, 
403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).  Ironically, in Ughetto, the court held the privilege against self-
incrimination did not attach to examinations conducted by a non-treating psychiatrist on the 
ground that the purpose of a civil commitment was not the marshalling of evidence but a 
determination of the clinical needs of the patient.  Ughetto, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403.  This rationale 
was clearly wrong because when a non-treating psychiatrist examines a patient, he or she does so 
for the express purpose of gathering evidence to support the hospital’s position. 
177. Morris, supra note 138, at 340-41 (quoting In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 
494, 492 (Mont. 2001)). 
178. Eastman, supra note 44, at 325; Morris, supra note 138, at 330 (noting hearings average 
approximately twenty-three minutes); Michael Perlin, “Their Promises of Paradise”:  Will 
Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional “Least Restrictive Alternative” Principle in 
Mental Disability Law, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 999, 1021 (2000).  The average time of the seventy-
eight hearings about which the author gathered data was forty-one minutes.  However, if one 
excludes eight hearings conducted in Cook and Kane counties in Illinois, the average time was 
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Accordingly, while physicians will certify patients who do not meet the 
civil commitment criteria,179 the failings of the commitment system have 
resulted in hospitals continuing to confine individuals who fail to satisfy the 
commitment standard.180  Like nearly blind deference to psychiatric testi-
mony by judges, informal, non-adversarial commitment proceedings also 
serve to further an unstated goal of providing treatment to those who 
require treatment regardless of whether they pose a danger to themselves or 
others.181  The failure of the civil commitment hearing to fulfill its raison d’ 
etre, namely limiting commitments to those who satisfy the commitment 
criteria, emboldens clinicians who wish to confine individuals—whom they 
deem require treatment but who fail to satisfy the commitment criteria—to 
seek the commitment of such individuals.182  Coupled with the excessive 
deference judges give to psychiatric testimony, the failures many authorities 
have found inherent in the civil commitment system have meant stricter 
commitment standards have not resulted in a concomitant protection of 
liberties for subjects of civil commitment. 
V. COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM—THE ARBITRARY AND 
EXCESSIVELY VAGUE CONCEPT OF DANGER 
What has also contributed to the ability of psychiatrists to unduly 
influence the legal process is the exceedingly ambiguous concept of 
danger.183  By definition, any standard imposed by the Supreme Court to 
satisfy due process cannot violate the Constitution.  However, as the school 
desegregation cases have taught, broad constitutional standards, such as “all 
deliberate speed,”184 require further interpretation and clarification if the 
class of individuals who have been subject to unconstitutional actions are 
going to benefit from a seminal Supreme Court decision that changes the 
legal landscape.  In the civil commitment context, the seminal Supreme 
Court case was O’Connor v. Donaldson, which held a state cannot confine 
a mentally ill person who is capable of surviving safely in the commu-
 
thirty-four minutes.  In Cook and Kane counties, the eight hearings observed averaged one hour 
and forty-nine minutes in length. 
179. See supra notes 57-134 and accompanying text. 
180. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 67. 
181. In re R.O. serves as an example of a court subverting basic due process principles to the 
goal of providing treatment deemed necessary.  See generally In re R.O., 2002 ND 154, 652 
N.W.2d 327.  In that case, the court required a mentally ill individual to proceed with his 
commitment hearing—when the court-appointed counsel only one day earlier—on the ground that 
a continuance was not in the committee’s best clinical interests. Id. at 327. 
182. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 67. 
183. See, e.g., Arrigo & Williams, supra note 75, at 187 (detailing descriptions of the 
dangerousness requirement as “woefully lacking” and “malleable and clouded by incoherence”). 
184. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
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nity.185  This is particularly true when, as in both the school desegregation 
and civil commitment contexts, those charged with enforcing or applying 
the new protective standard oppose the new standard and utilize what 
amounts to unforeseen vagueness to frustrate its implementation.186 
Well-settled Supreme Court doctrine requires individuals who enforce 
government law may not act on an ad hoc or subjective basis.187  Hence, 
due process requires the existence of “reasonably explicit standards for 
those who are to enforce the rules and regulations.”188  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has strongly suggested due process is violated when a law 
provides state officials “absolute discretion” to determine what conduct 
falls within the statute.189 
Challenges to the use of undue discretion in the enforcement of a gov-
ernment law have generally been based on void for vagueness grounds.190  
The lack of a generally accepted legal or psychiatric meaning of “danger-
ousness” in many jurisdictions, and the failure of psychiatrists to receive 
training to evaluate dangerousness, have resulted in mental health experts 
providing their own personal and subjective definition of the term.191  As 
detailed below, without clarifying or otherwise narrowing the concept of 
dangerousness, the commitment of mentally ill individuals, because physi-
cians have deemed them “dangerous,” can result in the type of arbitrary 
enforcement the void for vagueness doctrine prohibits.  Under this doctrine, 
a legal standard is impermissibly vague and, hence, violates due process, 
when it results in “those who are responsible for its administration . . . 
‘differ[ing] as to its application.’”192 
First, it is not entirely clear what the concept of “dangerousness” 
encompasses.  At the very least, any contention that a person is dangerous 
encompasses numerous assertions.  A psychiatrist who certifies an indivi-
dual as dangerous concludes the person has certain characteristics that are 
associated with a certain probability of harmful behavior.  The probability 
of harmful behavior is sufficiently great as to justify preventive interven-
tion.193  In addition to assessing the likelihood of harm, the factfinder may 
 
185. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
186. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 105, at 66 (stating the absence of a requirement to specify 
gravity of harm has resulted in an arbitrary application of commitment laws). 
187. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). 
188. Bass Plating Co. v. Town of Windsor, 639 F. Supp. 873, 880 (D. Conn. 1986). 
189. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 61 (1999). 
190. See, e.g., id. at 46-52. 
191. Steadman, supra note 37, at 267. 
192. In re Commitment of N.N., 679 A.2d 1174, 1181 (N.J. 1996) (quoting Coates v. 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)). 
193. Monahan & Wexler, supra note 36, at 38. 
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also examine the magnitude and imminence of any harm that may occur.194  
Finally, in the absence of qualifying language, an evaluator must determine 
the nature of harm that is at risk of occurring.  Is it physical harm to oneself 
or another person?195  Does the concept of harm also include emotional 
harm, as one court concluded?196  Is someone subject to commitment if he 
or she poses a threat of harm to property but not another person?197 
While a few courts have addressed the issue of whether a finding of 
dangerousness encompasses the likelihood of imminent harm and the mag-
nitude of harm that may occur,198 courts in most jurisdictions have not 
addressed these considerations and, hence, have failed to establish a frame-
work for physicians to apply.199  Moreover, in the absence of statutory 
language or a judicial opinion clarifying the meaning of “danger,” a 
clinician can interpret any threat to cause harm as creating a danger, 
regardless of the remoteness of the threat.200  Likewise, when the perceived 
 
194. See Joel A. Dvoskin & Kirk Heilbrun, Risk Assessment and Release Decision-Making:  
Toward Resolving the Great Debate, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 6, 9 (2001) (detailing 
how a clinician or factfinder can assess magnitude, probability, and imminence); McNeil & 
Binder, supra note 41, at 1321 (stating even commitment statutes with specific probability esti-
mates are often vague about the time frame of risk and setting in which harm may occur). 
195. See Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 451 (D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 
407 F. Supp. 509, 514-15 (D. Neb. 1975); In re Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1983). 
196. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (D. Ala. 1974). 
197. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 176 (9th Cir. 1980) (examining the constitutionality 
of a commitment statute that authorized confinement based on a threat of harm to property); State 
v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 301 (N.J. 1975) (holding “danger” includes a risk of substantial destruction 
of property). 
198. See Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Torksi C., 918 N.E.2d 
1218, 1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Hatcher v. Wachtel, 269 S.E.2d 849, 852 (W. Va. 1980); Krol, 
344 A.2d at 302. 
199. See PERLIN, supra note 54, § 2A-4.1.  A concept of danger that requires a factfinder to 
take into account the probability, magnitude, and imminence of any harm helps to reconcile these 
competing interests of the state in protecting against harm and individual interest in liberty.  It also 
creates a less arbitrary concept of danger by structuring an assessment process where the greater 
the magnitude, the less certainty of harm should be needed.  See Commonwealth v. Nasasr, 406 
N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (Mass. 1980).  For example, a vast difference exists between someone who has 
access to guns and manifests homicidal ideation toward a specific potential victim and someone 
who lacks impulse control but has no history of violent behavior and does not manifest homicidal 
ideation.  Certainly with the former commitment subject, a factfinder should not have to reach the 
same conclusion about the level of certainty and imminence as would the factfinder assessing the 
latter commitment subject. 
200. Sherry Colb, Insane Fear:  The Discriminatory Category of “Mentally Ill and 
Dangerous”, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 341, 348 (1999).  Two states have 
recently removed an imminence requirement from their commitment statutes. Monahan, supra 
note 47, at 401.  An absence of an imminence requirement is particularly significant because in 
the civil commitment context, psychiatrists base most commitments on an assessment that a 
patient is dangerous because of an inability to meet his or her basic needs.  See supra note 53 and 
accompanying text.  Even if patients have been meeting their basic needs, if a psychiatrist opines a 
patient’s symptoms render the patient at risk of suffering harm in the future, the absence of 
empirical data on the issue of one’s inability to meet needs makes cross examination difficult.  
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danger amounts to a threat of harm to property, one must ask whether the 
potential harmful acts consist of property destruction that also places indi-
viduals at risk of harm or that simply place one at risk of losing money.201  
Hence, little question exists that the dangerousness criteria is sufficiently 
flexible or vague to allow considerable discretion in determining whether 
an individual satisfies the criteria.202 
A determination of an individual’s dangerousness differs from most 
fact-finding determinations.  It is a forward-looking determination where a 
physician, at the very least, evaluates the likelihood of an allegedly men-
tally ill person causing harm to either self or others.203  This differs from the 
traditional fact-finding in which the trier of fact must evaluate whether a set 
of facts occurred previously and apply this set of facts to a particular legal 
standard.  Put another way, in criminal and in most civil contexts, the 
ultimate issue involves an application of past fact to law; in the civil com-
mitment context, the trier of fact must apply facts to assess the likelihood of 
an event occurring in the future.204 
Because one purpose of a civil commitment hearing is to assess the 
likelihood of a particular event occurring, rather than determining whether 
specific conduct has occurred, in the absence of definitive guidelines that 
incorporate all facets of a dangerousness determination, the trier of fact has 
 
Coupled with the deference given to psychiatric opinions, see supra notes 138-48 and accom-
panying text, the absence of an imminence requirement makes it much easier for clinicians to 
justify an assessment of self-danger that may have little basis in fact.  See, e.g., Robert Simon, The 
Myth of “Imminent” Violence In Psychiatry and the Law, 75 U. CINN. L. REV. 631, 636 (2006) 
(recognizing a requirement of likely harm in the foreseeable future can range from ten minutes to 
ten years). 
In In re Commitment in Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d 851 (Wis. 2002), the court found a commit-
ment statute was not unconstitutionally vague when it required, inter alia, a substantial probability 
that, if left untreated, the individual would suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that 
would result in loss of ability to function independently in the community.  However, the court 
never addressed whether the clause “function independently in the community” resulted in undue 
discretion in its application.  For example, does the ability to sustain oneself by living in a 
homeless shelter constitute an ability to function independently in the community? 
201. See In re H.G., 632 N.W.2d 458, 462-63 (N.D. 2001) (holding an insignificant financial 
injury resulting from poor business judgment was insufficient to satisfy the danger requirement). 
202. Bagby et al., supra note 109, at 32; see also Steven Datlof, The Law of Civil Commit-
ment in Pennsylvania:  Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 
38 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 3, 18 (1999); Christyne Ferris, Note, The Search for Due Process in Civil 
Commitment Hearings:  How Procedural Realities Have Altered Substantive Standards, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 959, 973 (2008) (stating without limiting criteria, the broad scope of the 
dangerousness standard renders it meaningless); Janus & Prentky, supra note 57, at 1449.  For a 
comprehensive survey of the language of civil commitment statutes detailing the disparity in 
specificity in commitment statutes, see Steven Erickson et al., Beyond Overt Violence:  
Wisconsin’s Progressive Civil Commitment Statute as a Marker of a New Era in Mental Health 
Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 388 (2005). 
203. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
204. See David Simpson, Jr., Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment:  The Dangerousness 
Standard and Its Problems, 63 N.C. L. REV. 241, 255 (1984). 
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far greater discretion to rule in a manner consistent with his or her value 
system, as opposed to applying fact and law in a neutral manner.205  As one 
New York Judge candidly recognized when pleading with the appellate 
courts or legislature to clarify the meaning of posing a substantial “threat of 
harm,” decisions to commit or release “were inevitably based upon my 
personal values and standards.”206 
Jurek v. Texas207 does not compel a different result.  In Jurek, the 
Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge to a death penalty statute 
that required a determination there was a probability the defendant would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat 
to society.208  However, no reasonable juror could believe the issue of 
imminence was a consideration in this determination:  having concluded a 
defendant committed murder, the statute required a determination that the 
defendant would engage in violent, criminal conduct at any future time.209  
Likewise, because the statute required an assessment of a probability of 
violent, criminal conduct, no issue of magnitude existed for the jury. 
A review of the few vagueness challenges to dangerousness require-
ments in state civil commitment statutes reveals that whether an application 
of the dangerousness requirement violates due process may depend on 
whether, to what degree, and how a state legislature has defined danger.210  
An Illinois appellate court held the definition of “dangerous conduct” in the 
state’s commitment law is impermissibly vague and violates due process, 
even though the statute defined “dangerous conduct” as “threatening 
behavior or conduct that places another individual in reasonable expectation 
of being harmed, or a person’s inability to provide, without the assistance of 
family or outside help, for his or her basic physical needs so as to guard 
himself or herself from serious harm.”211  On the other hand, another court 
 
205. Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion and “The Progress of Law,” 10 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1988); Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 226-27 
(1984). 
206. Judge Sees Lack of Guidelines For Committing Mental Patients, N.Y. L.J., November 
27, 1987, at 1.  Indeed, there is little question that any assessment of dangerousness contains a 
normative component through which a clinician reaches a conclusion that the level of risk posed is 
sufficiently great as to warrant the deprivation of liberty that civil commitment entails.  See 
Nicholas Scurich & Richard John, The Normative Threshold for Psychiatric Civil Commitment, 50 
JURIMETRICS J. 425, 427 (2010). 
207. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
208. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 267-68, 275-76. 
209. See id. at 269. 
210. See Simon v. Cook, 261 Fed. Appx. 873, 883 (6th Cir. 2008) (determining a statute that 
authorized police to detain a dangerous individual was not impermissibly vague because the 
statute defined dangerous as a “substantial physical harm or threat of substantial physical harm 
upon self, family or others”). 
211. In re Torksi C., 918 N.E.2d 1218, 1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).  The court reasoned the 
statute was impermissibly vague because it arguably authorized confinement in circumstances 
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has strongly suggested a statute authorizing confinement when an indivi-
dual poses a “substantial risk of physical harm” satisfies due process, while 
a statute authorizing confinement when an individual “constitutes a danger” 
does not.212  Likewise, “danger of physical harm” does not provide suffi-
cient guidance to satisfy due process.213  To summarize, whether indivi-
duals transported to a hospital’s psychiatric emergency room for evaluation 
suffer a deprivation of liberty often depends on the comparative weight the 
particular examining physician gives to the competing interests of liberty 
and the need for treatment.214  Until appellate courts impose limiting criteria 
 
where the state does not have a legitimate interest in confining someone, such as when a person 
places another at risk of suffering emotional harm as a result of being subject to racial slurs. Id. at 
1231. 
212. See Recovery Northwest v. Thorslund, 851 P.2d 1259, 1260 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
213. See Mays v. State of Washington, 68 P.3d 1114, 1121 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003). 
214. Admittedly, a number of other courts have rejected void for vagueness challenges to 
state civil commitment statutes.  See generally In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1986); In re 
Maricopa County, 840 P.2d 1042 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).  However, in neither case did the courts 
examine the risk of arbitrary enforcement created by a standard that permits, but does not require, 
utilization of the concepts of imminence and magnitude and gives physicians the opportunity to 
weigh the probability of harm against the need for treatment.  Indeed, the court in LaBelle recog-
nized utilization of the civil commitment process presented a danger of impermissibly imposing 
majoritarian values on a person’s chosen lifestyle.  LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 144.  However, the 
LaBelle court held this danger was remedied by the requirement of recent, tangible evidence of a 
person’s inability to meet one’s basic needs that presented “a high probability of serious physical 
harm within the near future.” Id.  Not only are judges generally more informed about any 
narrowing of legal criteria than are physicians, but, notwithstanding the performance of many 
lawyers in the civil commitment process, see supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text, one 
would expect lawyers to educate those judges who are ignorant of the governing legal criteria.  In 
the absence of good legal training and some sort of directive that physicians not only apply the 
commitment statute on its face but adhere to narrowing constructions by courts, physicians are left 
with a broad range of discretion when examining individuals in the psychiatric emergency room.  
Indeed, the court in Maricopa County upheld the commitment standard because “[t]he difficulty in 
expressing concepts [that would narrow and/or clarify governing substantive criteria] is particu-
larly evident in mental health statutes.”  Maricopa County, 840 P.2d at 1050.  The difficulty in 
articulating relevant mental health concepts does not justify permitting continued application of 
the statute.  Rather, administrative directives must direct physicians to apply the standard in a 
uniform manner.  Finally, the court in In re Commitment of Curiel, upheld a statute that authorized 
commitment if the court found it was “substantially probable” the committee would commit 
sexual violence.  See generally In re Commitment of Curiel, 597 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. 1999).  The 
Curiel court found its interpretation of the term “substantially probable” to mean “much more 
likely than not” meant individuals of common intelligence would not differ as to its applicability. 
Id. at 708-09. 
In re Vanderblomen, while resolving a vagueness challenge to the constitutionality of a 
commitment statute, does not provide authority on this issue.  See generally In re Vanderblomen, 
956 P.2d 1320 (Kan. 1998).  The patient in Vanderblomen asserted the statutory definition of 
mental illness violated the void for vagueness doctrine because mental illness required reference 
to the DSM-IV, a diagnostic guide published by the APA that modified the categories of mental 
disorders defined as mental illnesses. Id. at 1323.  The challenge to the statute in question did not 
involve an assertion that the absence of any reference to the concepts of magnitude and immi-
nence in connection to an assessment of dangerousness rendered the statute vague.  But see Glatz 
v. Kort, 807 F.2d 1514, 1521 (10th Cir. 1986) (upholding the constitutionality of a law authorizing 
the release of an insanity acquitee only when the individual has no mental condition that would 
likely cause harm to be a danger to self or others); United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 675 
         
2010] THE TAIL STILL WAGS THE DOG 297 
on this standard, certifying physicians retain the ability to fit their legal 
findings to their desired clinical objectives. 
VI. CORRECTING THE PROBLEMS:  STEPS TO LIMIT THE 
INAPPROPRIATE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHIATRISTS 
A. UTILIZE STRUCTURED CLINICAL EVALUATIONS TO LIMIT THE 
EXERCISE OF UNSTRUCTURED CLINICAL DISCRETION AT THE 
CERTIFICATION STAGE 
To rectify the problems related to the exercise of unstructured clinical 
judgment when assessing risk, psychiatrists should base their opinions on 
empirically-based data.215  For instance, they can rely on the use of the 
clinically adjusted actuarial method, which has been considered the most 
accurate method of assessing risk.216  Literature suggests a number of ways 
to improve dangerousness assessments of patients facing civil commit-
ment.217  The clinically adjusted actuarial method involves the use of a 
statistically based formula with the clinician making adjustments based on 
the particular clinical aspects of the case.218  Alternatively, the guided 
clinical approach requires a clinician to identify and incorporate into the 
evaluation process specific risk factors, but permits the clinician to weigh 
the factors in any manner he or she deems appropriate.219  It may well be 
the clinically adjusted actuarial method and guided clinical approach 
improve the accuracy of the assessment process because they limit clinical 
 
(10th Cir. 1982) (upholding a federal law requiring the imposition of increased punishment for 
dangerous special offenders).  However, at least Schell appears to be distinguishable.  In Schell, 
the court was making a determination of future harm only after a conviction.  Schell, 692 F.2d at 
675.  A diminished liberty interest in this instance may well provide the government with greater 
latitude in taking steps to further its police power.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 
n.12 (1973) (holding a person who possesses an absolute liberty interest and faces a loss of liberty 
is differently situated from an already-convicted defendant and entitled to a higher degree of 
protection). 
215. See, e.g., Borum, supra note 46, at 953 (stating structured and standardized risk assess-
ment processes will improve accuracy); Dvoskin & Heilbrun, supra note 194, at 9; Caroline Mee 
& Harold Hall, Risky Business:  Assessing Dangerousness in Hawaii, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 63, 90-
112 (2001) (detailing various empirically-based methods of assessing danger); Steadman, supra 
note 37, at 269 (detailing the usefulness of two tools in assessing risk of harm:  the HCR-20 and 
the Violence Risk Assessment Guide). 
216. In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).  The 
clinically-adjusted actuarial method involves the use of a statistically-based formula with the 
clinician making adjustments based on the particular clinical aspects of the case. See id. 
217. Admittedly, much of the literature addressing ways to improve the process of assessing 
danger does not involve the assessment of the civil commitment population.  However, because all 
relevant literature involves the assessment of people with mental illness, one can expect that what 
empirical research involving the mentally ill population as a whole has found will prove 
instructive in the context of civil commitment. 
218. See id. 
219. See Scherr, supra note 42, at 21. 
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discretion while enabling clinicians to take into account significant particu-
lar aspects of any case.220 
Two risk assessment scholars, Dale McNeil and Renee Binder, have 
aided clinicians who recognize the need to structure clinical judgment by 
developing a concise actuarial screening tool to aid in assessment of a 
patient’s potential for violence.221  The tool has correctly classified sixty-
five percent of individuals assessed and demonstrates the potential for 
developing simple, easy-to-use actuarial type methods that enhance the 
accuracy of risk assessments.222  Other, perhaps less simplistic, actuarial 
assessment tools that have been shown to enhance the accuracy of the 
assessment process consist of the HCR-20223 and a classification tree that 
directs psychiatrists to analyze specific empirically-based factors when 
assessing risk.224 
The use of some sort of checklist can help to eliminate a common 
problem in dangerousness assessments, which can be considered one-way 
evaluations of dangerousness:  the examination of risk factors only.  A risk 
factor is a measurable characterization of each subject in a specified popula-
tion that precedes the outcome of interest and that can be used to divide the 
population into two groups:  a high risk group, and a low risk group.225  An 
evaluation of risk factors, but not protective factors, i.e., factors that lower 
the risk of harm-causing behavior, is inherently inaccurate and constitutes 
an implicitly biased evaluation.226 
 
220. See Binder & McNeil, supra note 115, at 1192 (stating assessment tools enhance 
evaluations by grounding assessments in variables associated with probability of harm); Litwack, 
supra note 59, at 414 (noting the use of actuarial or structured assessment tools ensures clinicians 
will consider certain relevant factors). 
221. Dale McNiel & Renee Binder, Screening for Risk of Inpatient Violence, 18 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 579, 584-85 (1994).  This consists of a screening checklist that contains five items:  
physical attacks during the two-week period prior to admission; absence of suicidal behavior 
(attempts, gestures, or threats) in the two-week period prior to admission; diagnosis of schizo-
phrenia or mania; male gender; and the status of currently married or living together.  See also Ole 
Thienhaus & Melissa Piasecki, Assessment of Psychiatric Patients’ Risk of Violence Toward 
Others, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1129, 1129-30 (1998) (recommending clinicians gather 
concrete sets of information when assessing risk of violence). 
222. McNeil & Binder, supra note 221, at 584. 
223. See Litwack, supra note 59, at 431.  The HCR-20 is a risk assessment guide that 
requires a clinician to evaluate ten historical criteria, five clinical criteria, and five risk 
management criteria. Id. at 430. 
224. See John Monahan et al., Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for Assessing 
Violence Risk, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 312, 318 (2000). 
225. Helena Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms with the Terms of Risk, 54 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 337, 338 (1997). 
226. See Rogers, supra note 145, at 598; see also Hanson, supra note 48, at 52-53 
(discussing three plausible approaches to assessment of harm to others—guided clinical, pure 
actuarial, and adjusted actuarial—all of which require reference to specifically delineated factors). 
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No reason exists why similar clinicians cannot utilize similar checklists 
when their initial clinical impressions suggest a patient may pose a danger 
to himself by suicide or as a result of an inability to meet one’s basic needs.  
Known risk factors related to suicide exist,227 which should facilitate the 
utilization of a checklist related to suicide.  In the absence of literature, 
mental health professionals, hospital administrators, and patients’ lawyers 
should attempt to collaborate on a checklist that will guide the evaluation 
process when a clinician believes a patient may lack the ability to meet his 
or her needs.  The use of structured clinical decision-making can help elimi-
nate pretextual assessments of danger.  Structured risk assessments require 
clinicians to apply an individual’s history, symptoms, and behavior to a pre-
determined empirically-based set of criteria.  Accordingly, clinicians will 
no longer be able to justify an assessment of danger on symptoms, behav-
iors, or history presented by a patient that best justify a determination 
sought to be reached prior to the beginning of the examination.228 
Today, it is not uncommon to see hospital records containing forms 
with clearly delineated criteria that guide a clinical assessment of risk.  
However, psychiatrists complete these forms after a patient has been certi-
fied for commitment.  The failure to require psychiatrists to use these forms 
at the certification stage facilitates the continued use of unstructured clinical 
judgment.  It also sends a message to physicians that a careful, structured 
assessment of risk at the certification stage is not important; a careful 
assessment of risk is important only after certification of the patient has 
been completed.  In other words, a careful assessment of risk is important 
for risk management consideration but not because the consequences of the 
assessment can significantly impact individual rights. 
B. FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION, PROMPTLY PROVIDE COURT-
APPOINTED EXPERT ASSISTANCE 
When civil committees challenge their hospitalization, the committing 
hospital will offer, as evidence, expert testimony of a psychiatrist.229  The 
 
227. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 355-57. 
228. Cf. Monahan, supra note 63, at 503. 
229. See, e.g., McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 289; Morris, supra note 138, at 331; Van 
Duizend & Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 258.  In all of the forty-six hearings in New York about 
which the authored gathered data, the committing hospital presented expert psychiatric testimony.  
Likewise, in fifteen of the sixteen hearings in Dade County, the hospital presented medical 
testimony; the lone exception occurred when the hospital presented the patient’s guardian as its 
lone witness.  The pattern varied somewhat in Illinois.  In Cook County, the committing hospital 
proffered the testimony of a psychologist in four out of four cases.  In Kane County, the hospital 
presented a psychiatric expert in all four cases observed.  In the four cases observed in Madison 
County, the hospital presented a psychiatrist once, a psychologist once, and a social worker twice.  
In the two cases that went to trial in Union County, the hospital presented a psychologist twice. 
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ability of psychiatrists to conclude a patient is dangerous when they want to 
provide treatment as a result of the amorphous nature of the concept of dan-
ger, and the significant reliance on this expert testimony by judges, places 
civil committees at a distinct disadvantage.  Only the ability of committees 
to offer expert testimony of their own enables them to overcome this disad-
vantage; the failure to provide an opportunity to offer this evidence violates 
due process. 
The Supreme Court has recognized, for all intents and purposes, civil 
commitment proceedings revolve around psychiatric and other expert 
testimony: 
There may be factual issues to resolve in a commitment proceed-
ing, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the 
inquiry.  Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to 
either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on 
the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psy-
chiatrists and psychologists.230 
That a committing hospital always employs psychiatrists in its attempt to 
prove its case indicates the use of psychiatric experts is a “necessit[y], not 
[a] luxur[y].”231  Indeed, one Supreme Court Justice has recognized because 
commitment for compulsory psychiatric treatment involves medical issues, 
“a person possessing . . . [psychiatric or other mental health] . . . qualify-
cations normally would be preferred” to the assistance of an attorney.232 
Lower state courts that have examined the issue have also recognized 
expert assistance may well be more important than the assistance of a 
lawyer: 
No matter how brilliant the lawyer may be, he is in no position to 
effectively contest the commitment proceedings because he has no 
way to rebut the testimony of the psychiatrist from the institution 
who has already certified to the patient’s insanity . . . . 
 
230. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). 
231. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
232. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (Powell, J., concurring); see also United States v. 
Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (1956) (Frank, J., dissenting) (“The best lawyer in the world cannot 
competently defend an accused person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to the 
defense [such as an expert] . . . .  In such circumstances, if the government does not supply the 
funds, justice is denied the poor—and represents but an upper bracket privilege[.]”); Proctor v. 
Harris, 413 F.2d 383, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[I]f an indigent patient needs and is entitled to a 
lawyer, far more may he also need the assistance of a psychiatrist in the preparation of his case.); 
David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 281, 329 (1990) (recognizing in a number of settings, an expert is more valuable to 
a litigant than an attorney). 
         
2010] THE TAIL STILL WAGS THE DOG 301 
This court has had enough experience to know that psychiatrists 
differ very definitely in their evaluations and diagnoses of mental 
illness.  In a commitment proceeding where the court is in effect 
bound by the expertise of the psychiatrist, the right to counsel is of 
little value without a concurrent right to an independent 
psychiatric examination.233 
Another court noted: 
“[T]he rights to counsel and to be heard in a civil commitment pro-
ceeding will often fail to adequately protect the respondent unless 
he is able to secure the advice or testimony of his own examiner.  
Otherwise, the respondent and his lawyer will have difficulty in 
rebutting or exposing errors and other deficiencies in the testimony 
of the expert state witnesses.” 
. . . Where the respondent’s liberty is at stake, the assistance of an 
independent expert is essential to a fair trial and impartial 
hearing.234 
In Ake v. Oklahoma,235 the Supreme Court held a criminal defendant 
who raised the insanity defense was entitled to a psychiatric expert to assist 
in the preparation and presentation of the case.236  An application of Ake to 
the civil commitment context warrants the conclusion that involuntarily 
hospitalized individuals who challenge their confinement are also entitled to 
this assistance.  A court must afford a litigant an “opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”237  
This right to meaningful participation applies to civil proceedings that are 
“quasi-criminal” in nature.238  While the Supreme Court has never defined 
“quasi-criminal,” the state involvement in commitment proceedings and the 
constitutionally protected interests, such as liberty, that are at stake in a 
commitment proceeding suggest that commitment hearings are “quasi-
criminal” in nature.239 
 
233. In re Gannon, 301 A.2d 493, 494 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). 
234. In re Williams, 478 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (quoting GOVERNOR’S 
COMM’N FOR REVISION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CODE OF ILL., REPORT 60 (1976)) (citation 
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Curnette, 871 A.2d 839, 843 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding 
an indigent individual facing civil commitment is entitled to expert assistance in a sexually violent 
predator civil commitment proceeding). 
235. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). 
236. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83. 
237. Id. at 76. 
238. Id. 
239. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1981) (holding a paternity suit was quasi-
criminal because state involvement “undeniably pervaded” the proceeding); In re Ruffalo, 390 
U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (determining disbarment proceedings, which require due process protection, 
“are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature”).  Civil commitment proceedings are far 
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However, the concept of meaningful participation is only a starting 
point when determining whether due process requires the provision of 
expert assistance.  Rather, in determining whether due process requires the 
provision of expert assistance, a court must examine the private interest 
affected by the action of the state, the governmental interest affected if a 
court provides the procedural right in question, the probable value of the 
safeguard sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the appro-
priate interest if the safeguard is not provided.240 
As noted, civil commitment “produces a massive curtailment of 
liberty;”241 an “almost uniquely compelling” interest,242 which the Supreme 
Court has characterized as a fundamental right.243  While the Supreme 
Court has held the Due Process Clause requires the provision of an expert 
psychiatrist to an indigent criminal defendant who places his sanity in issue, 
the civil committee possesses a far more significant liberty interest than 
does the criminal defendant.  The criminal defendant who successfully util-
izes expert assistance to win a verdict of not guilty or not responsible by 
reason of insanity will nevertheless suffer a deprivation of liberty in a psy-
chiatric hospital instead of prison.244  On the other hand, a civil committee 
who prevails at his commitment hearing obtains outright release.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has concluded liberty differs qualitatively from other 
constitutionally protected interests, requiring greater procedural protections 
than other constitutional interests.245  An involuntarily hospitalized patient 
also suffers the stigma of the court system labeling him or her as mentally 
ill and dangerous, which “can have a very significant impact” on the com-
mittee.246  Finally, involuntary hospitalization can subject the civil com-
mittee to liability for care and treatment charges.247 
 
more quasi-criminal than these proceedings because the state will invoke its police or parens 
patriae powers to confine those deemed to pose a threat to society or themselves.  Developments 
in the Law:  Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1222 (1972). 
240. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. 
241. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 
509 (1972)). 
242. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. 
243. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992). 
244. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(2) (McKinney 1996); Jones v. United States, 
463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983). 
245. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (holding the right 
to counsel presumptively attaches only when an indigent litigant could face a loss of physical 
liberty). 
246. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979). 
247. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 43.01 (McKinney 1989) (authorizing the New 
York State Office of Mental Health to assess care and treatment charges); Rodriguez v. City of 
N.Y., 861 F. Supp. 1173, 1188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 72 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 
1995); Chill v. Miss. Hosp. Reimbursement Comm’n, 429 So.2d 574, 580-81 (Miss. 1983); 
Musselman v. Dept’ of Soc. & Health Servs., 134 P.3d 248, 251 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006). 
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The government interest in not providing expert assistance is ambig-
uous at best.  This is particularly true because of the different governmental 
entities whose interests are implicated by the appointment of a psychiatric 
expert.  One can assume payment for a psychiatric expert comes from the 
budget of a state’s office of court administration.  While this governmental 
agency has a financial interest in not spending money for experts, this 
interest is “not substantial.”248  On the other hand, the provision of expert 
assistance furthers the interests of the state agency that operates a state’s 
psychiatric hospitals and the municipalities that operate psychiatric wards 
or entire facilities.  Because the provision of psychiatric assistance enhances 
the accuracy of civil commitment proceedings,249 psychiatric assistance 
furthers the governmental interest “in confining its costly mental health 
facilities to cases of genuine need”250 and achieving just and accurate 
adjudications within the judicial process.251 
The appointment of a psychiatric expert is of great value to a civil 
committee; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty without the expert 
is significant.  What the Supreme Court described in Ake in the context of a 
mentally ill defendant asserting the insanity defense applies with equal, if 
not greater, force in the civil commitment context:  “[P]sychiatrists gather 
facts, through professional examination, interviews, and elsewhere, that 
they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze the information gathered 
and from it draw plausible conclusions.”252  Similarly, the Supreme Court 
held for the putative insanity acquittee, expert testimony was a necessity, 
and the defendant may be at an unfair advantage “if he is unable because of 
poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him.”253  
It is inconceivable that a different conclusion can be reached for a person 
civilly committed.  First, while doctors invariably testify that a patient is 
dangerous, the lack of accuracy in dangerousness assessments warrants the 
 
248. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 
533 (2004) (“[O]rdinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State’s 
failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts.”); Little v. Streater, 
452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) (noting a state’s monetary interest in not providing blood grouping “is 
hardly significant” compared to the interests of both the individual participants and the state in 
obtaining an accurate determination). 
249. See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text. 
250. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 585, 604-05 (1979).  To illustrate, one study in New York 
found more accurate psychiatric assessments can result in diverting to patients living in the com-
munity approximately $40,000 per patient wrongfully determined to require inpatient hospitali-
zation.  Alan Lipton & Franklin Simon, Psychiatric Diagnosis in a State Hospital:  Manhattan 
State Revisited, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 368, 372 (1985). 
251. See Medine, supra note 232, at 329. 
252. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80. 
253. Id. at 82 n.8 (internal quotations omitted). 
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need for a second opinion.254  If judges carefully scrutinized expert testi-
mony, the absence of a court-appointed expert might not create a particu-
larly significant risk of erroneous deprivations of liberty.  However, it is 
clear judges do not carefully scrutinize psychiatric testimony.255 
It is fair to ask, if psychiatrists frequently lack accuracy in their assess-
ments of danger, why a court-appointed expert could reach a more accurate 
assessment about a person’s dangerousness than a psychiatrist who testifies 
on behalf of the committing hospital.  First, the doctor-patient relationship 
does not exist between the court-appointed expert and the civil committee; 
this relationship may result in an assessment of danger as a function of a 
desire to treat.256  More significantly, even if the conclusions of the court-
appointed expert are no more inherently accurate than the hospital physi-
cian, when two doctors reach the same conclusion about an individual’s 
dangerousness, then one can feel more confident in the assessment of the 
hospital physician than if no other doctor reached the same conclusion.  If 
the court-appointed expert reaches a different conclusion about a commit-
tee’s dangerousness than the hospital physician, the differing opinions will 
force a judge to scrutinize the opinions of both experts to determine which 
opinion should carry more weight. 
Finally, the need to combat potentially biased testimony is another 
consideration when assessing whether the Constitution requires the provi-
sion of expert assistance.257  Indeed, perhaps more than any other witness in 
any other litigation, the psychiatrist has the ability to color testimony to 
reach the conclusion he or she wishes—that the patient is dangerous.  A lay 
witness must testify to observations.  Experts must support testimony 
through detailed methodology and, in the field of science, empirical sup-
port.  However, because of both the lack of empirical data related to short-
 
254. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text; see also Ake, 470 U.S. at 81 (noting 
psychiatrists frequently disagree on an individual’s dangerousness); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418, 429 (1979) (discussing the “[l]ack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis”); 
Lipton & Simon, supra note 250, at 370 (stating hospital psychiatrists at one state hospital 
incorrectly diagnosed seventy-three out of eighty-nine patients as schizophrenic, a diagnosis that 
may carry an incorrect prognosis for long-term hospitalization). 
255. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text; see also MELTON ET AL., supra note 
19, at 350 (suggesting the use of a second physician in court may reduce the probability of an 
erroneous commitment as a result of uncritical acceptance of a lone doctor’s testimony); Morris et 
al., supra note 77, at 200 (discussing a study finding judges agreed with clinicians’ assessments of 
danger in 327 out of 328 cases). 
256. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.  Admittedly, the patient’s treating doctor 
may not testify in court.  See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.  However, in these 
situations, the court-appointed expert may not face the same institutional loyalties or pressures 
that might compromise an assessment of danger, such as testifying against the clinical positions 
taken by a colleague. 
257. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S 1, 14 (1981) (recognizing the utility of expert testimony 
in combating the strong self-interest of litigants that could color testimony in paternity litigation). 
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term risk, particularly whether a patient can meet his basic needs, and the 
vague and value-laden nature of the dangerousness standard,258 when psy-
chiatrists wish to reach a conclusion a person is dangerous, there is little to 
deter the expert from reaching this conclusion. 
An application of the Ake standard should have resulted in any court 
looking at this issue and concluding the Due Process Clause requires the 
provision of expert assistance to a civil committee.259  The one federal court 
that addressed this issue ruled otherwise.  In Goetz v. Crosson, the court 
held due process requires the appointment of a psychiatric expert to assist a 
civil committee only in those specific instances when a committee’s attor-
ney can detail reasons why an expert is needed to educate him or her in 
particular aspects of a case.260  The court further held due process requires 
the appointment of an “independent” psychiatrist, an expert who will serve 
the court and be available to testify for either side in the commitment hear-
ing, when the committee is indigent and the trier of fact determines he or 
she cannot accurately assess whether a patient meets the civil commitment 
criteria in the absence of an expert to provide information to the court.261 
The court first noted the results of a civil commitment hearing impact 
more than a committee’s interest in liberty, stigma, and paying for 
hospitalization; a civil committee possesses an interest in receiving treat-
ment for one’s mental illness.262  The committee also has an interest in 
avoiding situations that both place the committee at risk of harm or subject 
the committee to incarceration or acts of reprisal by third-parties.263  The 
court also intimated the provision of expert assistance will result in some 
mentally ill individuals not receiving treatment.264  The court concluded the 
provision of experts will result in fewer commitments, though a decrease in 
commitments differs from an increase in erroneous adjudications, and the 
court-appointed expert will not always be correct when testifying for the 
patient.265 
The court further differentiated civil commitment proceedings from a 
criminal trial, concluding that in the commitment setting, the interests of the 
parties are not entirely adverse, which lessens the imperative that court-
 
258. See supra notes 54, 206 and accompanying text. 
259. One could view the right to expert assistance as part of the right to effective assistance 
of counsel that necessarily includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary services.  See Waltz 
v. Zumwalt, 213 Cal. Rptr. 529, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
260. Goetz v. Crosson (Goetz I), 967 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1992). 
261. Id. at 36. 
262. Id. at 33. 
263. Id. at 33. 
264. Id. at 34. 
265. Id. 
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appointed experts arrive at the most accurate assessment possible.266  
Moreover, the court-appointed neutral expert fulfills the most important 
function of the Ake-type expert—providing testimony favorable to the 
committee if the doctor’s conclusions warrant this testimony.267  Finally, 
the court expressed confidence that lawyers for civil committees could de-
velop a sufficient level of expertise in the field of psychiatry to render 
unnecessary the services of an expert to assist in the preparation and 
presentation of the committee’s case.268 
The rationale adopted by the Second Circuit to avoid applying Ake in a 
straightforward manner cannot withstand scrutiny.  Without citing any au-
thority, the court assumed state court judges lack the ability to parse con-
flicting psychiatric testimony.  While ample literature exists detailing what 
some—including this author—believe constitutes poor performance by 
many state court judges who conduct civil commitment hearings,269 one 
would expect the addition of contrasting expert testimony would facilitate a 
discontinuation of the abdication of the decision-making function by the 
courts, if for no other reason than a court must determine which expert pro-
vided more persuasive testimony.  As the Second Circuit itself recognized, 
the underlying premise of the adversary system is if counsel for each party 
vigorously represents their clients to the best of their ability, this action 
should result generally in an accurate resolution of the case.270  The Second 
Circuit cited no reason to believe otherwise in the civil commitment 
context. 
Furthermore, the need for lawyers to develop expertise does not justify 
the appointment of an expert for the court in lieu of one for the civil com-
mittee.271  If the appointment of an expert to assist the court, as opposed to 
 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 35. 
268. Id. 
269. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text. 
270. See Goetz I, 967 F.2d at 34 (noting competing psychiatric testimony enables the fact-
finder “to make its most accurate determination of the truth on the issue”) (internal quotations 
omitted).  However, the court concluded because civil commitment proceedings were not com-
pletely adversarial in nature, the logic underlying the “battle of the experts” did not hold in the 
civil commitment process. Id.  This statement is disingenuous.  The logic underlying how a battle 
of the experts enhances the truth finding process applies regardless of the degree of adversity 
between the parties.  To what degree a court should attempt to enhance the truth finding process is 
another question. 
271. It may be that regardless of the development of expertise, counsel cannot provide the 
same level of cross-examination as he or she would with the assistance of an expert.  See John 
West, Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant:  The Constitutional Mandate of 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1353-54 (1986).  As one authority has asserted, in 
order for attorneys to provide effective cross-examination, they must develop expertise through, 
inter alia, consultation with their own experts. Id. at 1355 (citing 2 F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL 
TECHNIQUE § 14.23 (3d ed. 1985)).  Even if the Due Process Clause does not require an optimal 
         
2010] THE TAIL STILL WAGS THE DOG 307 
the civil committee, furthered any significant governmental interest, then 
advantages resulting from the appointment of an expert to assist the 
committee might not be warranted.  However, the interest in saving money, 
which is the only legitimate government interest implicated by the appoint-
ment of an expert, is essentially the same regardless of what type of expert a 
court appoints.272 
Finally, the Second Circuit’s willingness to treat commitment proceed-
ings as less than fully adversarial is also questionable.  In reaching this con-
clusion, the court relied in substantial part on the recognition that “[i]t 
cannot be said . . . that it is much better for a mentally ill person to ‘go free’ 
than for a mentally normal person to be committed.”273  However, this 
consideration is pertinent when determining the proper burden of proof in a 
commitment hearing because the burden of proof serves, inter alia, to 
allocate the risk of error in any judicial proceeding.274  It has no relevance 
when examining the constitutional status of a procedural protection aimed 
at enhancing the accuracy of the judicial determination at issue.  Regardless 
of how the risk of error should be allocated, “an erroneous confinement 
should be avoided in the first instance.”275 
It is not entirely clear why the Second Circuit believed a hospital’s 
desire to provide treatment justified a less than completely adversarial trial 
process.  Did the court believe even if commitment proceedings resulted in 
the confinement of mentally ill individuals who were erroneously deemed 
dangerous, the treatment provided to the individuals rendered wrongful 
hospitalization more tolerable than a wrongful conviction?  The premise 
assumes all individuals subject to the civil commitment process suffer from 
mental illness and will benefit from treatment; a premise that is certainly 
questionable.276  Accordingly, any decision to justify reduced procedural 
 
level of cross-examination, the relative equality of access to assistance at the trial level between a 
committing hospital and a patient should constitute a factor in the overall due process analysis, 
particularly when little countervailing interests exist in providing a neutral expert as opposed to a 
witness for the civil committee. 
272. The role of a consultant expert would require approximately the same amount of time as 
would the role of an independent expert.  The time spent examining the civil committee, review-
ing records, and perhaps talking to others is the same in both roles.  The amount of travel time and 
appearance time is approximately the same.  The only difference consists of the ability of an inde-
pendent expert to leave the courthouse following his testimony while a consultant expert would 
remain to assist throughout the entire hearing.  Admittedly, the role of a consultant would require 
the expert to engage in case discussion and preparation with the civil committee’s attorney.  How-
ever, this constitutes a small percentage of the time spent by the expert.  Hence, any difference in 
the cost of a consultant expert as compared to the cost of an independent expert is de minimus. 
273. Goetz I, 967 F.2d at 35 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979)). 
274. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. 
275. Id. at 428. 
276. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 351 (suggesting the stigma and institutional 
dependency resulting from hospitalization may outweigh the benefits of treatment). 
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safeguards because the government acts in the best interest of the commit-
tee must be “candidly appraised” and is particularly troubling in “light of 
the wide divergence of medical opinion regarding the diagnosis of and 
proper therapy for mental abnormalities.”277 
Because of the often questionable consequences of institutional treat-
ment, it is reasonable to conclude a wrongful involuntary hospitalization 
will be, at times, more pernicious than a wrongful conviction.  This is so for 
no other reason than psychiatric hospitals subject civil committees to “intru-
sive inquiries into . . . [their] . . . innermost thoughts”278 through the use of 
mind-altering medication that produces many debilitating side effects.279 
Finally, by limiting the provision of an expert to serve the court to only 
those cases in which the court deems the appointment necessary for a 
reliable assessment of the committee, the Second Circuit placed the com-
mittees in a particularly tenuous position.  Primarily because judges over-
value psychiatric testimony,280 which also necessarily means courts under-
value lay evidence, civil committees may require expert testimony just to 
explain why a reliable assessment of his psychiatric condition requires 
independent expert testimony.  The plaintiffs in Goetz raised a second issue 
of importance in developing a mechanism to provide expert testimony to 
assist individuals in the commitment process:  the permissible period of 
delay resulting from the appointment of an expert.  The Goetz plaintiffs 
litigated this issue following the remand of the case by the Second Circuit, 
as the appointment of the court expert resulted in delays of four to six 
weeks.281  A review of pertinent law demonstrates that a failure to provide a 
timely commitment hearing when a court appoints an expert violates the 
Constitution.282 
 
277. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586-87 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
278. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993). 
279. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 293 n.1 (1982). 
280. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text. 
281. Goetz v. Crosson (Goetz II), 41 F.3d 800, 803 (2d Cir. 1994). 
282. It is difficult to set forth a bright-line rule regarding the point at which a delay will vio-
late due process because courts are reluctant to measure due process requirements in a fixed term 
of days.  See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 (2d Cir. 1983).  However, due process 
is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands[.]” Id. 
(internal quotations omitted).  Thus, due process requires courts to take steps to develop a list of 
experts—similar to a list of lawyers—who are available for appointment to satisfy the constraints 
of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  In so doing, due process requires courts to spend 
enough money to induce experts to serve on the panel and remain available to promptly examine 
patients and testify.  See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); 
N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. State, 196 Misc.2d 761, 790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding the 
judicial system violates due process when it fails to effectively provide constitutionally required 
procedural protections because of the amount of money it pays professionals to provide services). 
         
2010] THE TAIL STILL WAGS THE DOG 309 
The government may not condition the exercise of a right or privilege 
upon the forfeiture of another right or privilege.283  State law conferred 
upon the plaintiff class in Goetz a right to a hearing within five days.284  
Furthermore, many courts have recognized the Constitution requires the 
right to a hearing within a period shorter than six weeks.285  Hence, require-
ing civil committees to wait up to six weeks for a hearing with the opportu-
nity to present favorable expert testimony can be construed as conditioning 
the exercise of the right to expert assistance upon the forfeiture of the right 
to a prompt hearing and/or a violation of basic due process tenets that 
require a prompt hearing in order to challenge one’s hospitalization.286 
Significant delays that result from the appointment of an expert violate 
another constitutional doctrine:  the government may not institute a practice 
that chills the assertion of a constitutional right.287  An impermissible chill 
exists when requiring patients to choose between a hearing within five days 
and requesting the appointment of an independent psychiatrist “impairs to 
an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.”288  
 
283. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of 
Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1981). 
284. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31 (McKinney 2006). 
285. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091-92 (D. Wis. 1972), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Wis. 1974), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (D. 
Wis. 1976) (requiring a judicial hearing within fourteen days); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413, 
419 (D. Ky. 1975) (requiring a court hearing within twenty-one days of confinement; requiring a 
probable cause hearing initially); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (D. Ala. 1974) 
(requiring a full judicial hearing within thirty days, but a probable cause hearing within seven 
days). 
286. As two officials of the National Center for State Courts recognized, a litigant whose 
liberty is at stake should not forfeit statutory or constitutionally imposed standards governing 
speedy trial provisions simply because the litigant requires the use of a psychiatric expert. See 
Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz, An Examination of Mental Health Expert Assistance Provided to 
Indigent Criminal Defendants:  Organization, Administration and Fiscal Management, 34 N.Y. L. 
SCH. L. REV. 19, 106-07 (1989). 
287. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968); United States v. 
Glover, 588 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1978) (examining whether a statute that permits a court to 
impose the costs of prosecution chills a defendants’ assertion of the right to stand trial).  Although 
the impermissible chill argument is similar to the argument that the excessive delays resulting from the 
appointment of an expert impermissibly conditions the right to expert testimony on the waiver of the 
right to a prompt hearing, these arguments are distinct.  The latter argument is based upon a line of 
cases that prohibit the state from requiring an individual to choose between one of two rights or 
privileges, both of which an individual is entitled to exercise.  The “chill” argument is based upon a 
line of cases that hold the government may not unduly discourage the exercise of one’s constitutional 
right by imposing an unwarranted penalty that significantly deters an individual from exercising such 
right.  See, e.g., Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581-82; Glover, 588 F.2d at 878. 
288. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973).  The right to a prompt hearing furthers 
the individual interest in avoiding unnecessary confinement and the possible liability for hospital 
charges.  See supra notes 241, 247 and accompanying text.  It also furthers the governmental 
interest in limiting inpatient mental health services to cases of genuine need. See supra note 250 
and accompanying text. 
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However, in Goetz v. Crosson (Goetz II),289 the Second Circuit failed to 
address these issues.290  Rather, the court concluded because of the lack of 
available experts, and the failure of the plaintiffs to provide a meaningful 
remedy to correct the problem, the district court did not err in finding four 
to six week delays did not violate the rights of civil committees.291  
However, in so ruling, the court ignored the firmly established distinction 
between a constitutional violation and the remedy needed to correct it.292 
Until state courts implement a plan that guarantees civil committees 
with such assistance, the committees will remain severely disadvantaged 
when they challenge initial dangerousness determinations by psychiatrists.  
Any such plan must require psychiatrists to commit to examine patients and 
appear on the first scheduled date of the proceeding, while understanding 
the appointment requires them to assist the civil committee and his counsel.  
If and/or when civil committees in other jurisdictions raise challenges 
similar to those in Goetz I and Goetz II, the courts should reject those cases 
as persuasive authority. 
C. PROHIBIT EXPERTS FROM RENDERING OPINIONS ABOUT AN 
INDIVIDUAL’S DANGEROUSNESS BASED ON UNSTRUCTURED 
CLINICAL JUDGMENT 
Whether a psychiatrist, in testifying, “predicts” that a civil committee 
will likely cause harm or “assesses” the level of risk posed by the commit-
tee as sufficiently great to render him or her dangerous, the expert renders 
expert testimony on the ultimate issue of danger.  Numerous authorities 
have asserted psychiatrists should not render opinion testimony about an 
individual’s dangerousness.293  More significantly, there exists support in 
 
Delaying the commitment hearing many weeks clearly lessens the remedial impact of a hear-
ing that should correct errors in the initial decision by one or more physicians to confine an 
individual.  If requiring indigent defendants to reimburse the government for the cost of court-
appointed counsel impermissibly chills the right to court-appointed counsel, see Olson v. James, 
603 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1979); Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D. Or. 1984), any 
plan that significantly penalizes a mentally ill individual for seeking favorable expert testimony 
poses significant concerns.  Likewise, if undue delays in the appellate criminal process violate due 
process, see Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1991), or other proceedings in which 
a constitutional interest is at stake, see Kraebel v. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 405 
(2d Cir. 1992), the same result should apply when one must wait an excessive amount of time in a 
psychiatric hospital before challenging one’s confinement. 
289. 41 F.3d 800 (2d Cir. 1994). 
290. Goetz II, 41 F.3d at 803-05. 
291. Id. at 804-05. 
292. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971). 
293. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 350; Robert Schopp et al., Expert Testimony 
and Sexual Predator Statutes After Hendricks, 6 EXPERT EVIDENCE 1, 15 (1998); Robert Schopp 
& Michael Quattrocchi, Predicting The Present:  Expert Testimony and Civil Commitment, 13 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 159, 160 (1993). 
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the law for prohibiting experts from rendering opinions about an indivi-
dual’s dangerousness. 
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals294 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael295 established the 
standards governing expert testimony in federal court.296  Numerous states 
have adopted the Daubert criteria.297  The standard adopted in Frye v. 
United States298 continues to serve as the law governing expert testimony in 
other jurisdictions.299  An application of either standard requires courts to 
rule psychiatrists should not testify a patient is or is not “dangerous” when 
these clinicians base their opinion on clinical judgment alone.  This is the 
case whether the expert seeks to testify the patient poses a danger to others, 
poses a danger to self because of an inability to meet his or her basic needs, 
or is dangerous because of a threat of suicide. 
Daubert requires a trial judge to consider the following criteria to 
determine the admissibility of expert opinions:  whether the scientific 
theory or technique can be, and has been, tested;300 whether the theory or 
technique has been subject to peer review and publication; the known rate 
of error for any particular technique; and the general rate of acceptance 
within the relevant scientific community.301  A court can also consider 
whether existing standards control the technique’s operation.302  As for 
assessments of danger based on a determination that a patient lacks the 
ability to meet his or her needs, there has been no testing whatsoever to 
determine what factors correlate to a heightened risk of self-harm.303  
 
294. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
295. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
296. Daubert addressed the issue of the admissibility of scientific testimony.  See Daubert, 
509 U.S. at 593.  Kumho Tire applied Daubert to all expert testimony.  See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. 
at 147-48.  Hence, Kumho Tire eliminates the need to address the rather thorny question of 
whether psychiatry is a science, although one court has characterized it as an art rather than a 
science.  See People v. Stoll, 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
297. Post Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in 
State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 §§ 12-13 (2001) [hereinafter Post Daubert Standards]. 
298. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
299. Post Daubert Standards, supra note 297, §§ 12-13. 
300. Kumho Tire makes clear that a trial judge can also consider whether any theory or 
technique underlying specialized, but non-scientific, knowledge can be, and has been, tested.  See 
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149. 
301. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
302. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149. 
303. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  A risk factor is a variable that correlates 
with a projected outcome and the variable precedes the outcome, although a causal relationship 
does not necessarily exist between the variable and the outcome.  See Monahan, supra note 46, at 
905-06 n.27.  Viewed another way, “[a] correlation is the statistical degree of relationship between 
two variables.”  Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos:  
Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1860-61 n.91 
(2003). 
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Although not applying Daubert, one court concluded expert testimony 
lacked competence when the expert relied on risk factors derived from 
clinical judgment not based on any scientific research or principles accepted 
in the psychological community.304 
Likewise, there have been virtually no publications relating to the 
assessment process pertaining to one’s inability to meet one’s needs.305  
Moreover, while there is no known rate of error, literature suggests psychia-
trists lack the ability to determine who can manage in the community in the 
absence of inpatient treatment.306  Furthermore, empirical data relating to 
the assessment of violence risk establishes clinical evaluations alone are far 
less accurate than both actuarial assessments and assessments where an 
actuarial assessment guides the clinical process.307  There is general accep-
tance of clinical assessments in the sense that the psychiatric profession 
continues to engage in them, notwithstanding the general criticism of the 
process.  Finally, no standards exist to control the manner in which psychia-
trists assess one’s ability to meet one’s needs. 
Empirical literature detailing risk factors for suicide exists.308  To the 
extent literature has assessed the accuracy of clinical assessments of danger, 
the low base rate of suicide behavior results in inaccurate assessments of 
danger.309  As in the case of assessing one’s ability to meet needs, the psy-
chiatric profession engages in the practice, but the profession has imposed 
no controls over the manner in which psychiatrists conduct the assessments. 
The application of the Daubert criteria to assessments of the risk of 
harm to others does not warrant a different result in connection with an 
unstructured assessment of danger.  First, a slightly better-than-chance level 
of success310 should not satisfy the requirement of evidentiary reliability as 
to warrant admissibility.  When one compares the slightly better-than-
chance success rate with the significant concordance rate between opinion 
 
304. See In re Coffel, 117 S.W.3d 116, 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). 
305. One set of authorities has detailed a number of considerations for clinicians to examine 
when assessing one’s ability to meet his needs.  See MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 358.  These 
criteria appear to consist of practical, common sense factors that enable clinicians to draw logical 
inferences about a person’s ability to meet his or her needs.  However, they were not based on 
empirical studies.  Two authorities contend testifying clinicians should limit any assertion that a 
civil committee is dangerous to those situations where the civil committee presents similar charac-
teristics to subjects in studies that serve as the predictive model for the testifying expert.  See 
Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Is it Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future Violence, 16 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 624 n.4 (1992).  As noted, no such models exist today. 
306. See Morse, supra note 76, at 596.  Although Professor Morse detailed this lack of skill 
over thirty years ago, the author is not aware of any more recent research to the contrary. 
307. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
308. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 355-57. 
309. See, e.g., id. at 357. 
310. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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testimony and judicial dispositions,311 the prejudicial effect of the expert 
testimony outweighs its probative value.312  Accordingly, while the two 
generations of this type of empirical research have been subject to publica-
tion and peer review, the general unreliability of unstructured clinical 
assessments and the absence of any limitations on clinical judgment should 
render these opinions inadmissible.313 
Finally, the amorphous meaning of danger means any assessment of 
danger results in an expert incorporating his or her own values about 
liberty, a factor that has no relation to any professional expertise.314  Until 
empirically-generated data enables clinicians to offer specific opinions 
about the level of risk posed in terms of particular numerical probabilities 
that are based on a reasonable degree of professional certainty, any assess-
ment of risk contains a value judgment that warrants a finding of inadmis-
sibility.315  Nor should courts that apply the Frye standard admit into 
evidence opinions about a civil committee’s dangerousness.  Frye autho-
rizes admission when the principle or procedure in question has gained 
 
311. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
312. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).  To illustrate, there has 
been only one study over the last twenty years that examined the accuracy of violence assessments 
made in psychiatric emergency rooms.  Monahan, supra note 47, at 407.  This study contained a 
false positive rate of almost forty-seven percent.  See Lidz et al., supra note 41, at 1010.  If one 
assumes a ninety percent concordance rate between judicial dispositions and expert conclusions, 
see supra note 139 and accompanying text, this means a court will erroneously confine approxi-
mately four out of every ten patients assessed.  This turns on its head the contention by Judge 
Newman of the Second Circuit that the ratio of erroneous releases to erroneous confinements 
should be approximately three or five to one.  See Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 
1992) (Newman, J., concurring). 
313. See Harris & Rice, supra note 59, at 1169 (stating no evidence exists that clinicians’ 
unaided assessments of violence risk are better than those of laypersons).  One authority has 
concluded from the time of the initial studies detailing an inability of clinicians to assess violence 
risk, “[l]ittle has transpired . . . to increase confidence in the ability of psychologists or psychia-
trists, using their unstructured clinical judgment, to accurately assess violence risk.” Monahan, 
supra note 47, at 406-07; Simon, supra note 200, at 642 (noting an assessment of imminent harm 
is unlikely to satisfy the Daubert requirements).  But see Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 562 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding expert testimony about a defendant’s dangerousness admissible 
notwithstanding the absence of any particular methodology that one could subject to scrutiny 
because of empirical research relating to sexual offenders). 
314. See Binder & McNeil, supra note 115, at 1192; Schopp & Quattrocchi, supra note 293, 
at 166.  Perhaps one day appellate decisions will generate enough specificity as to what constitutes 
dangerousness to eliminate the potential for an expert’s intrinsic values about liberty impacting 
any assessment about an individual’s dangerousness.  This might well require case law clarifying:  
(1) the likelihood of harm required in terms of a particular percentage; (2) how, if in any way, the 
potential magnitude impacts any assessment of danger; and (3) the impact of considerations of the 
imminence of any potential harm. 
315. Cf. Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication:  The Effects 
of Using Actual Cases Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency 
Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271, 272 (2000). 
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general acceptance in its specified field.316  However, when one evaluates 
the general acceptance of psychiatric assessments of danger, a little per-
spective is in order.  Prior to O’Connor v. Donaldson and its progeny, both 
the law and clinical practice required psychiatrists to assess only mental 
illness and a need for treatment.  This required only an assessment of 
symptoms and behaviors, a practice for which members of the psychiatric 
profession were trained.  When the law required a completely different 
determination of dangerousness, psychiatrists continued to make the 
required assessments without regard to their ability to do so.  While a few 
authorities have questioned the appropriateness of a dangerousness stan-
dard,317 the psychiatric profession as a whole has continued to make these 
assessments willingly, if for no other reason than it has helped perpetuate its 
control over the civil commitment process.318 
Hence, assessments of danger differ from all other novel scientific 
evidence that Frye governs.  When examining the admissibility of a particu-
lar scientific technique, the scientific community of which the testifying 
expert is part has little interest in the particular judicial proceeding at hand, 
or judicial proceedings in general that the question requiring expert analysis 
has been raised.  The profession’s only interest is its professional integrity.  
However, the psychiatric profession possesses an institutional interest in:  
(1) accepting its clinical assessment as reliable; and (2) having assessments 
of danger gain general acceptance in the community to further the profes-
sional prerogative of facilitating the commitments of individuals doctors 
want to treat.  Accordingly, an assumption exists that when novel scientific 
evidence gains acceptance in the relevant scientific community, sufficient 
evidentiary reliability exists to warrant admissibility.  This is not the case 
with assessments of danger. 
As a general rule, opinion testimony is admissible when an expert 
possesses sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience so the opinion will aid 
the trier of fact.319  It is clear as to the issues of the risk posed by one’s 
inability to meet one’s needs and one’s suicidality, no particular expertise 
exists.  While empirical research provides a font of knowledge for 
psychiatrists to apply on the issue of violence, the unchecked use of clinical 
 
316. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994); In re Detention of 
Strauss, 20 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
317. See, e.g., Norko, supra note 46, at 282. 
318. This can be evidenced in no small part by the brief of the APA before the Supreme 
Court where the APA argued psychiatrists lacked the ability to assess long-term danger, but 
emphasized the existence of the professional prerogative to assess short-term danger in the civil 
commitment process.  Brief of Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 10 n.7, 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080). 
319. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 137, at 69-70. 
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discretion renders too many assessments of risk unreliable.  When an expert 
relies on clinical judgment alone, no mechanism exists to determine 
whether the expert has applied the empirical data in a valid way to warrant 
the conclusion the testimony will aid the trier of fact.320  That the question 
of an individual’s dangerousness is an ultimate issue in a commitment hear-
ing further militates toward a determination that opinions of dangerousness 
are inadmissible.321  Opinion testimony on an ultimate issue is admissible 
only when it addresses subject matter beyond the realm of the factfinder, 
the facts cannot be described to the factfinder in a way that will enable him 
or her to form an accurate judgment, and no better evidence than opinion 
testimony is available.322 
Better evidence is available and it enables clinicians to provide appro-
priate testimony in civil commitment proceedings.  Clinicians can testify 
about what factors relate to any heightened risk of harm and how the symp-
toms of mental illness and the civil committee’s behavior relate to known 
risk factors for harm.323  Such a rule strikes a proper balance between the 
court’s interests in obtaining information from experts who can educate the 
court while eliminating highly prejudicial testimony that is both value-laden 
and evidentiarily unreliable.324 
Approximately thirty years ago, one critic equated psychiatrists who 
render testimony with used car salesman and carnival barkers—individuals 
 
320. See Monahan, supra note 63, at 513 (discussing the longstanding recognition that 
assessments produced by clinical judgment alone lack reliability and validity). 
321. The ultimate issue is a question that must be answered to resolve a proceeding.  See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 908 (9th ed. 2009). 
322. People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577, 582-83 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Cronin, 458 N.E.2d 
351, 352 (N.Y. 1983). 
323. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 350; Schopp et al., supra note 293, at 15.  Use of 
expert testimony in this manner answers the court in People v. Ward, where the court admitted 
expert testimony about an individual’s dangerousness on the ground, inter alia, that in civil 
commitment cases, an expert’s prediction about danger may be the only evidence available.  
People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).  In addition to excluding 
testimony about subject matter that far exceeds any clinician’s expertise, prohibiting experts from 
rendering opinions about a subject’s dangerousness helps to eliminate the problem of judges 
relying on expert testimony without any scrutiny.  See Paul Appelbaum et al., Expert Approaches 
to Communicating Violence Risk, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 137, 145 (2000). 
324. Two courts, relying on Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), have authorized the use 
of clinical assessment of an individual’s dangerousness.  See In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 
72, 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Lyle G. v. Harlem Valley Psychiatric Ctr., 521 N.Y.S.2d 
94, 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).  Reliance on Barefoot to exclude testimony under state evidentiary 
principles was wrong because the court in Barefoot held only that the Constitution did not prohibit 
expert testimony about danger.  See Barefoot, 483 U.S. at 896, 905 n.9.  Ironically, the Court in 
Barefoot distinguished People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1981), where the California 
Supreme Court held the trial court committed error in admitting a testimony concerning 
dangerousness.  The Court in Barefoot distinguished Murtishaw on the ground, inter alia, that the 
California Supreme Court did not base its decision on constitutional grounds.  See Barefoot, 463 
U.S. at 901-02 n.8. 
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who engage in polished double talk to hide a lack of competence about 
which they speak.325  While such criticism no longer applies to clinicians 
who assess risk based upon empirically grounded criteria, it holds true 
today with those psychiatrists who assert patients cannot meet their needs 
when no empirical research exists to support such testimony.  Prohibiting 
psychiatrists from rendering expert opinions sends a message:  if you 
believe someone poses enough of a risk to warrant commitment, first back 
up your conclusions with empirical data, and then show the court your 
assessment has eliminated any value judgments inherent in any assessment 
of danger. 
D. ATTORNEYS FOR PATIENTS MUST SYSTEMATICALLY APPEAL 
ADVERSE COMMITMENT DECISIONS AND APPELLATE COURTS 
MUST HOLD THESE APPEALS FALL WITHIN A 
MOOTNESS EXCEPTION 
The amorphous and value laden nature of the concept of dangerousness 
means that in the absence of appellate decisions  interpreting the concept of 
danger, physicians and trial courts will remain relatively free to interpret 
danger in any way they choose.326  Only systematic appeals that result in 
appellate courts interpreting the dangerousness criteria will eliminate the 
problem. 
Systematic appellate review enables courts to set forth criteria for 
lower courts to apply when assessing whether a patient’s clinical condition 
warrants a finding of danger.327  Appellate review further results in clarifi-
cation as to what conduct and symptoms of mental illness are sufficiently 
probative of the level or risk of harm that satisfies the legal criteria of 
danger.328 
 
325. See Poythress, supra note 139, at 205-06. 
326. See, e.g., Datlof, supra note 202, at 3, 18 (noting the elastic concept of dangerousness 
has resulted in courts within the same jurisdiction interpreting the criteria inconsistently). 
327. See In re David B., 97 N.Y.2d 267, 277-78 (N.Y. 2002) (suggesting courts consider a 
patient’s history of violent relapses when released into the community, history of substance abuse, 
the need for medication to control possible violence, and likely noncompliance with prescript-
tions); In re George L., 85 N.Y.2d 295, 308 (N.Y. 1995); In re Burton, 464 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ohio 
1984) (directing lower courts to examine, inter alia, a patient’s insight into his or her clinical 
condition as to warrant compliance with a medication regimen and likelihood of compliance if not 
confined). 
328. To illustrate, case law out of Oregon limits clinical discretion by making clear that a 
direct link must exist between prior actions, symptoms of mental illness, and a sufficiently high 
risk of harm as to warrant commitment.  See, e.g., State v. M.C., 206 P.3d 1096, 1098 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2009) (destroying an identification card in a fit of rage, spending disability income on drugs, 
and choosing to live on the streets in the dead of winter does not constitute clear and convincing 
evidence the civil committee posed enough risk of harm to self to warrant commitment); State v. 
Hambleton, 123 P.3d 370, 375 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (swimming once in forty degree weather did 
not render a patient dangerous because there was no showing the patient would again engage in 
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Appellate courts can also interpret ambiguous terms inherent in the 
concept of danger, which will further lessen the potential for the personal 
values of experts to inappropriately influence their testimony.329  Finally, 
appellate review can also result in other rules that will lessen the influence 
of psychiatric assessments of danger, such as requiring proof of a factual 
basis supporting expert opinions.330  However, the short-term nature of civil 
commitment orders results in the expiration of an appealed commitment 
order prior to the resolution of most appeals.  Appellate courts have strug-
gled with the issue of whether the short-term nature of commitment orders 
warrants finding an exception to the mootness doctrine to such a degree that 
the same court has issued seemingly contradictory rulings.331 
If for no other reason, the collateral consequences of a commitment 
order warrant the resolution of any appeal rendered moot by the expiration 
of the commitment order.332  Moreover, the cyclical nature of mental illness 
means it is likely a civil committee will again be subject to another commit-
ment proceeding.333  Because one’s clinical and behavioral history impacts 
 
the conduct or that the patient had or would suffer hypothermia); State v. Hayes, 121 P.3d 17, 21 
(Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding auditory hallucinations that told the civil committee to act out sexual 
assault on a puppy was insufficient proof the committee would suffer harm as a result of the 
hallucinations); State v. North, 76 P.3d 685, 688-89 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (determining a likely 
eviction, a desire not to take medication, and suffering one assault, without more, did not mean the 
patient would lack an ability to meet needs in the near future or suffer another assault if not 
confined); State v. Nguyen, 43 P.3d 1218, 1220 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (failure to treat diabetes did 
not mean the disease was life-threatening; general mental or physical deterioration did not 
necessarily mean the patient was dangerous). 
329. See Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654, 670 (Cal. 2002) (defining “likely to 
reoffend” as a “serious and well-founded risk” that the committee will commit sexually violent 
crimes); In re Commitment of Curiel, 597 N.W.2d 697, 704 (Wis. 1999) (defining “substantially 
probable” as much more likely than not). 
330. See, e.g., Johnstone v. State, 961 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. App. 1997); In re Cochran, 487 
N.E.2d 389, 390-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
331. Compare Boggs v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 972, 974 (1988) 
(dismissing appeal as moot), and In re Alfred H.H., 910 N.E.2d 74, 77-85 (Ill. 2009) (holding 
none of the exceptions to mootness doctrine warranted a determination of appeal), with George L., 
85 N.Y.2d at 302 n.2 (determining an expiration of a commitment order does not render an appeal 
moot because of the impact an appeal would have in the future), and In re Barbara H., 702 N.E.2d 
555, 559 (Ill. 1998) (stating the exception to mootness doctrine exists because of the short-term 
nature of a commitment order and the reasonable expectation a civil committee would again be 
subjected to the same action). 
332. See e.g., In re Nancy A., 801 N.E.2d 565, 574-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (determining 
commitment impacts adversely on the reputation of even someone previously hospitalized 
numerous times, thus requiring appellate review); In re Commitment of R.B., 386 A.2d 893, 894 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1978) (noting a lien resulting from imposition of care and treatment charges 
warranted deciding the commitment appeal); J.M. v. State, 178 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2005) (stating the stigma resulting from hospitalization constitutes a collateral consequence of a 
moot commitment order); State v. Condrick, 477 A.2d 632, 633 (Vt. 1984) (holding the 
imposition of legal disabilities and the resulting stigma from commitment warranted resolution of 
an otherwise moot appeal). 
333. See Barbara H., 702 N.E.2d at 559-60. 
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any assessment of danger,334 there can be little question any judicial 
determination of mental illness and danger creates collateral consequences 
for the civil committee by creating a very real risk a history of hospitali-
zation will have an adverse impact on a future assessment of danger.  How-
ever, more than any collateral consequences resulting from commitment, 
appellate courts must recognize only they, through the promulgation of case 
law, can provide the necessary guidance as to what constitutes a sufficient 
level of risk of harm to warrant commitment.  The need to clarify governing 
standards relating to the systematic deprivation of liberty of a vulnerable 
segment of society satisfies the public interest exception to the mootness 
doctrine that warrants resolution of appealed commitment orders that have 
expired.335 
Furthermore, while a court may initially believe the adoption of the 
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine simply to clarify the law 
through precedent is unwarranted,336 the need to clarify law that is in dis-
array warrants invoking the public interest exception.337  A legal standard 
that enables those who wish to apply it in a significantly unfettered manner 
amounts to law that is in disarray.  Attorneys for civil committees should 
continue to attempt to clarify the meaning of danger through appeals of 
commitment orders until the highest court of their state concludes the need 
to clarify what constitutes “dangerousness” does not warrant invoking an 
exception to the mootness doctrine.  If this were to occur, then it might well 
mean the failure of a state’s court system to clarify a constitutional standard 
that is inherently ambiguous amounts to a due process violation that 
warrants relief in the federal courts.338 
 
334. See, e.g., WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 121, at 28, 38. 
335. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted a public interest exception to the mootness 
doctrine.  See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding a resolution to an 
appeal of a moot commitment order was warranted because a number of people would be 
impacted by such an appeal); Campbell v. State, 846 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Ark. 1993) (stating the 
court will decide moot cases of great public interest); Hashimi v. Kalil, 446 N.E.2d 1387, 1389 
(Mass. 1983) (holding a public interest exception to mootness doctrine was invoked because of the 
great public importance in interpreting a commitment statute); In re N.B., 620 P.2d 1228, 1231 
(Mont. 1980) (deciding an appeal of an expired commitment order because of broad public 
concern in the resolution of the appeal); Proctor v. Butler, 380 A.2d 673, 675 (N.H. 1977) 
(invoking a public interest exception to mootness doctrine to decide important questions of law); 
In re Brunnell, 668 P.2d 1119, 1121 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (deciding a moot commitment appeal 
of great public importance). 
336. See Alfred H.H., 910 N.E.2d at 81. 
337. Id. 
338. See supra notes 183-214 and accompanying text. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
After the Supreme Court decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson, and 
federal district court cases such as Lessard v. Schmidt, imposed substantial 
substantive and procedural protections on states’ civil commitment 
processes, much promise existed that psychiatrists would be prohibited 
from imposing their values as to what is best for someone at the expense of 
civil liberties.  It did not happen.  Like the defeated confederacy after the 
Civil War, much of institutional psychiatry made clear its disdain for the 
new legal order and challenged those in a position to enforce the newly 
established legal norms to force change.  With a few exceptions, little has 
happened.  Again, with exceptions, lawyers for civilly committed patients 
have ceded their adversary role and tiptoed gingerly in the courtroom.  To a 
significant degree, courts have abandoned their role of neutral arbiters.  In 
addition, the amorphous concept of danger, a constitutional standard that 
was supposed to significantly limit commitments, has significantly con-
tributed to psychiatrists continuing to impose their values in an unchecked 
manner.  It is time for lawyers and courts to step up. 
Courts must afford committed patients an opportunity to present 
prompt expert testimony and prohibit psychiatrists testifying on behalf of 
either party in the commitment process from rendering testimony on the 
ultimate issue of danger.  Lawyers for patients must vigorously represent 
their clients in the commitment process in a way they would want others to 
represent their closest family members.  This includes systematically ap-
pealing adverse commitment decisions in a way that generates case law that 
clarifies the meaning of danger as to limit the discretion of psychiatrists in 
the future. 
Finally, psychiatrists must respect the law and take their obligation to 
conduct careful assessments of risk far more seriously than they presently 
do.  They must recognize regardless of whether they agree with legal stan-
dards that limit their clinical discretion, the law has entrusted them to apply 
these standards.  Psychiatrists can start with recognizing use of clinical 
judgment alone is likely to result in too many erroneous assessments of 
danger, and structure risk assessments around empirically-based clinical 
criteria.  When all this occurs, the protections set in place over thirty years 
ago will no longer be more apparent than real. 
